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Implicit Bias and the Illusion of Mediator Neutrality 
Carol Izumi  
INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiff (P), the owner/operator of a carpet cleaning business, 
sued the defendant-homeowners for $500 in a breach of contract 
action for the unpaid balance of a $1,000 carpet cleaning agreement. 
Defendants (Ds or Mr. and Mrs. D) counterclaimed for the return of 
the $500 deposit they paid before work began. Ds hired P to dry out 
and clean the soaked carpet in their basement, which had flooded 
during a storm. Ds refused to pay the balance because the carpet had 
not dried out as P promised. Under the small claims court mediation 
program, the parties were required to attempt mediation before a 
trial date was set. 
P was a middle-aged white male who attended the mediation in 
work clothes. Ds were an equally mature married couple of Asian 
descent who spoke with noticeable accents. They were dressed in 
what might be called “business casual” attire. The mediation was 
conducted around a large conference table by two white co-
mediators: a male who looked to be in his forties and a younger 
female. The mediators conducted a “caucus model” facilitative-style 
mediation. P presented the case as a simple breach of contract: the 
agreement between the parties required the homeowners to make two 
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$500 payments and the second payment had not been made. Mr. D 
complained that the business owner was trying to cheat him by 
charging him for work that was unsatisfactory. During the mediation, 
P and Mr. D had markedly different demeanors. P was matter-of-fact 
and even-tempered. Mr. D was angry and agitated. Mrs. D sat quietly 
behind and to the right of her husband during the mediation. She 
spoke once and was quickly shushed by her husband.  
In the joint session, P described the business transaction and his 
actions placing large fans in the basement to dry out the carpet. He 
stated that he had stressed to the homeowners the importance of 
keeping the upstairs door to the basement open for air to circulate. 
However, when he went to the house the following day, he found the 
door shut. P argued that the carpet did not dry as he expected 
because Ds did not keep the door open as instructed. The mediators 
asked P a number of questions about the contract, his interaction 
with Ds, and his professional cleaning techniques. When it was his 
turn to speak, Mr. D argued that P failed to complete the work as 
promised and that P‟s work was unsatisfactory. He asserted that the 
door was kept open as instructed; P saw it closed because Ds were 
preparing food and had temporarily shut the basement door in the 
kitchen because of the musty odor downstairs. During their co-
mediator caucus after the joint session, the mediators commented 
that Ds failed to keep the door open.  
In the individual sessions with the disputants, the mediators 
gathered and clarified information and explored options. P reiterated 
his position that he was entitled to the contract price since Ds‟ failure 
to keep the door open protracted the carpet drying process. In their 
individual session, Ds pressed that they were not satisfied with P‟s 
work because the carpet did not dry out in the promised time frame. 
Mr. D said he entered into the transaction cautiously because he was 
aware that American businesses sometimes take advantage of 
customers. After these two individual sessions, the mediators 
caucused and decided that the parties had reached an impasse. They 
brought the parties back together, conducted a bit more discussion, 
and concluded the session. The mediation was terminated in less than 
an hour without an agreement, and the matter was scheduled for 
trial. With more cases awaiting mediation, the mediators were 
quickly assigned another small claims case.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol34/iss1/4
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The preceding description is based on a small claims case 
mediation that I witnessed as a requirement for civil mediator 
certification in Michigan.
1
 As an observer, I wondered why the 
mediator team decided that Ds failed to keep the door open despite 
their consistent assertions to the contrary. What judgments did the 
mediators make to reach such a determination? I was curious as to 
why the mediators failed to explore the door open/door closed issue 
in the individual sessions with the parties since it seemed significant. 
What factors and phenomena might have influenced the mediators‘ 
thought processes, judgment, and decision-making? I immediately 
thought about the possibility that racial dynamics played a role. None 
of the other observers I asked imagined that racial issues were at 
play. Being the sole non-white observer, perhaps I was more sensitive 
to potential racial aspects in the mediation.  
One could view this mediation in a number of ways. When I 
presented this scenario to a group of mediation academics, one 
colleague opined that it was simply an example of bad mediation. In 
his view, the mediators seemed poorly skilled and their process 
lacked a systematic exploration of party interests, goals, priorities, 
and options. To him, the mediators were guilty of incompetence, 
nothing more. Another colleague supposed that the mediators were 
pressured by time limits and a waiting room full of parties in other 
cases. To this colleague, it was merely an example of ―speed 
mediation.‖ A third professor reasoned that the mediators made a 
credibility determination and decided that P was more believable. She 
allowed that mediators make credibility calls all the time and 
acknowledged that race could play a role in determining credibility. 
For all three mediation experts, nothing in the scenario raised 
concerns about mediator neutrality. I offer this mediation scenario as 
an opportunity to explore the nuances of mediator neutrality, consider 
the pervasiveness of unconscious bias, and provoke new dialogue.  
This Article probes the complex challenges of a mediator‘s ethical 
duty to mediate disputes in a neutral manner against the behavioral 
 
 1. Observation of two mediations was required as part of the Michigan civil mediator 
certification process. MEDIATOR TRAINING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES § 5.2.3 (Office of 
Dispute Resolution, Mich. Supreme Court 2005), available at http://courts.michigan.gov/scao/ 
resources/standards/odr/TrainingStandards2005.pdf. 
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realities of mediator thought processes, actions, motivations, and 
decisions. Part I begins with a dissection of the elements of mediator 
neutrality. Part II introduces the science of implicit social cognition 
and its application to various legal contexts, turning to the mediation 
process as a focal point. In Part III, using one particular racial 
category (Asian Americans), I tease out ways in which implicit bias 
might affect the mediators‘ conclusions and actions in a particular 
situation.
2
 Ending with Part IV, I present ideas that may help us get 
closer to the ideal of attaining ―freedom from bias and prejudice‖ in 
mediation. I conclude that the reduction of bias and prejudice 
demands more attention and effort than mediators currently devote to 
it. We must have the intention and motivation to undertake deliberate 
actions to reduce unconscious bias. Bias mitigation also requires 
proactive steps and a more robust curriculum than what is offered in 
many mediation trainings, programs, and classrooms.  
I. THE ESSENTIALITIES OF NEUTRALITY 
Mediator neutrality is universally understood to be a vital attribute 
of the mediation process. The traditional definition of mediation from 
the 2005 revised Model Standards of Conduct for Mediations 
(―Model Standards‖), originally approved in 1994 by the American 
Arbitration Association, the American Bar Association Section of 
Dispute Resolution, and the Association for Conflict Resolution, 
states, ―Mediation is a process in which an impartial third party 
facilitates communication and negotiation and promotes voluntary 
decision making by the parties to the dispute.‖3 Textbook definitions 
of the mediation process invariably use language about the 
involvement of a ―neutral‖ or ―impartial‖ third party. A sample of 
dispute resolution casebooks reveals similar descriptions of 
mediation as:  
 
 2. I chose Asian Americans as the focal group because of the Ds‘ ethnicity. Although I 
frame the discussion around this discrete group, I would suggest that many issues and ideas 
presented could be extrapolated to apply to other groups as well. 
 3. MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS, Preamble (2005), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/dispute/documents/model_standards_conduct_april2007.pdf.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol34/iss1/4
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 ―[A]n informal process in which an impartial third party 
helps others resolve a dispute or plan a transaction but 
does not impose a solution.‖4 
 ―[A] process of assisted negotiation in which a neutral 
person helps people reach agreement.‖5  
 ―[A] process in which a disinterested third party (or 
„neutral‟) assists the disputants in reaching a voluntary 
settlement of their differences through an agreement that 
defines their future behavior.‖6 
 ―[A] process in which an impartial third party acts as a 
catalyst to help others constructively address and 
perhaps resolve a dispute, plan a transaction, or define 
the contours of a relationship.‖7 
 ―[A] process in which a neutral intervener assists two or 
more negotiating parties to identify matters of concern, 
develop a better understanding of their situation, and, 
based upon that improved understanding, develop 
mutually acceptable proposals to resolve those 
concerns.‖8  
Neutrality is a core concept of mediation.
9
 Within the profession, 
there is widespread consensus about the vital importance of 
neutrality.
10
 Neutrality, along with consensuality, gives the mediation 
process legitimacy.
11
 ―The essential ingredients of classical mediation 
 
 4. LEONARD L. RISKIN ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS 16 (4th ed. 2009) 
(emphasis added).  
 5. DWIGHT GOLANN & JAY FOLBERG, MEDIATION: THE ROLES OF ADVOCATE AND 
NEUTRAL 95 (2006) (emphasis added).  
 6. JOHN W. COOLEY, THE MEDIATOR‘S HANDBOOK: ADVANCED PRACTICE GUIDE FOR 
CIVIL LITIGATION 2 (2000) (emphasis added). 
 7. CARRIE MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: BEYOND THE 
ADVERSARIAL MODEL 266 (2005).  
 8. JAMES J. ALFINI ET AL., MEDIATION THEORY AND PRACTICE 1 (2d ed. 2006) 
(emphasis added).  
 9. KIMBERLEE K. KOVACH, MEDIATION: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 211 (3d ed. 2004). 
 10. KATHERINE V.W. STONE, PRIVATE JUSTICE: THE LAW OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION 33, 41 (2000).  
 11. Hilary Astor, Rethinking Neutrality: A Theory to Inform Practice—Part I, 11 
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are: (1) its voluntariness—a party can reject the process or its 
outcomes without repercussions; and (2) the mediator‘s neutrality, or 
total lack of interest in the outcome.‖12 As a principle ―central to the 
theory and practice of mediation,‖ neutrality serves ―as the antidote 
against bias, . . . [which] functions to preserve a communication 
context in which grievances can be voiced, claims to justice made, 
and agreements mutually constructed.‖13  
Mediator neutrality is foundational to the mediation process. 
Other essential values, such as confidentiality and party self-
determination, rest upon the parties‘ perception of the mediator as an 
unaligned participant. Mediator neutrality legitimizes the mediation 
process because the parties, rather than the mediator, are in control of 
decision-making.
14
 To encourage the parties to share information 
freely and candidly with the mediator, the mediator promises not to 
take sides with the other party or use the information to advance the 
opponent‘s interests. Mediator neutrality makes it possible for parties 
to discuss issues of their choosing, negotiate with opponents, and 
design their own agreements.
15
 Moreover, the parties‘ expectation of 
mediator neutrality is the basis upon which a relationship of trust is 
built.  
Trust is attained and maintained when the mediator is 
perceived by the disputants as an individual who understands 
and cares about the parties and their disputes, has the skills to 
guide them to a negotiated settlement, treats them impartially, 
is honest, will protect each party from being hurt during 
mediation by the other‘s aggressiveness or their own perceived 
 
AUSTRALASIAN DISP. RESOL. J. 73, 73 (2000).  
 12. COOLEY, supra note 6, at 2.  
 13. Sara Cobb & Janet Rifkin, Practice and Paradox: Deconstructing Neutrality in 
Mediation, 16 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 35, 35 (1991). 
 14. Hilary Astor, Rethinking Neutrality: A Theory to Inform Practice—Part II, 11 
AUSTRALASIAN DISP. RESOL. J. 145, 146 (2000).  
 15. See Leah Wing, Whither Neutrality?: Mediation in the Twenty-First Century, in RE-
CENTERING: CULTURE AND KNOWLEDGE IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION PRACTICE 93, 94 (Mary 
Adams Trujillo et al. eds., 2008); see also Scott R. Peppet, Contractarian Economics and 
Mediation Ethics: The Case for Customizing Neutrality Through Contingent Fee Mediation, 82 
TEX. L. REV. 227, 256 (2003) (―[N]eutrality is considered fundamental to the self-determination 
for which mediation strives. To the extent that a mediator is biased towards one party, the 
mediator may undermine the parties‘ ability to craft their own solution to their problem.‖). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol34/iss1/4
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inadequacies, and has no interests that conflict with helping to 
bring about a resolution which is in the parties‘ best interest. 
Only when trust has been established can the parties be 
expected to be candid with the mediator, disclose their real 
interests and value the mediator‘s reactions . . . .16  
Neutrality is critical to the role of the mediator.
17
 Mediators must 
meticulously avoid even the appearance of partiality or prejudice 
throughout the mediation process.
18
 One mediation scholar has 
cautioned:  
Whether there is such a thing as pure neutrality or not, we 
know, and our clients know, that when we commit to being 
neutral, we are committing to not intentionally promoting one 
party‘s interests at the expense of another. When we choose to 
play that role, we must truly honor it, and the fact that we have 
a choice and decision to make about whether to put ourselves 
forward as a third-party neutral should only emphasize how 
important that commitment is.
19
 
While the importance of mediator neutrality is undisputed, what 
actually constitutes neutrality is less clear. Neutrality is discussed, 
practiced, and researched rhetorically, but there are no empirical 
studies demonstrating exactly what neutrality means.
20
 The 
mediator‘s function is nebulous due to the difficulty in defining 
neutrality.
21
 Despite its importance, mediation literature offers slim 
guidance on how to achieve neutrality.
22
 ―Neutrality is a hard concept 
to nail down. It has different meanings in different cultural contexts. 
In some contexts, the term neutral is associated with being inactive, 
 
 16. NANCY ROGERS & RICHARD SALEM, A STUDENT‘S GUIDE TO MEDIATION AND THE 
LAW 7–39 (1987), as reprinted in STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: 
NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, AND OTHER PROCESSES 113 (4th ed. 2003).  
 17. KOVACH, supra note 9, at 211.  
 18. COOLEY, supra note 6, at 28.  
 19. BERNARD S. MAYER, BEYOND NEUTRALITY: CONFRONTING THE CRISIS IN CONFLICT 
RESOLUTION 242 (2004). 
 20. Cobb & Rifkin, supra note 13, at 36–37. 
 21. MAYER, supra note 19, at 83.  
 22. Peppet, supra note 15, at 253–54.  
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ineffective, or even cowardly. In others, it is viewed as a sine qua non 
for third parties to establish respect.‖23  
Comprehension of mediator neutrality is complicated by the lack 
of consistency in definitions. The dispute resolution lexicon is 
imprecise. ―One reason that the theoretical concepts seem divorced 
from practice is that we do not yet have a shared vocabulary in our 
field. Although neutrality has aspects similar to fairness, justice, and 
appropriateness, as well as impartiality and lack of bias, it is not the 
same as those concepts.‖24 
There is no consensus within the dispute resolution community 
that neutrality and impartiality are terms of art or synonyms in the 
vernacular.
25
 Commentators and guidelines employ neutrality and 
impartiality circularly, asserting, for example, that ―mediators shall at 
all times remain impartial,‖26 or ―a mediator needs to remain 
impartial to be able to fulfill her role.‖27 Neutrality and impartiality 
are often used synonymously when discussing a mediator‘s ethical 
duty. One reason for this is because distinctions between the terms 
may appear synthetic or arbitrary.
28
 In their studies, Sara Cobb and 
Janet Rifkin found that fourteen out of fifteen mediators defined 
neutrality by using the word ―impartiality.‖29  
Other commentators and guidelines apply ―neutrality‖ to the 
outcome or the elements of any resolution and ―impartiality‖ to 
engagement with the parties.
30
 Douglas Frenkel and James Stark 
propose: 
 
 23. MAYER, supra note 19, at 83.  
 24. Alison Taylor, Concepts of Neutrality in Family Mediation: Contexts, Ethics, 
Influence, and Transformative Process, 14 MEDIATION Q. 215, 217 (1997). 
 25. KOVACH, supra note 9, at 212 (―Neutrality is often used interchangeably with a 
variety of other words and phrases: impartiality; free from prejudice or bias; not having a stake 
in the outcome; and free from conflict of interest. Other synonyms include unbiased, indifferent 
and independent. There is dissention within the mediation community about whether all of 
these terms define neutrality, and somewhat surprisingly, whether all, or any, are appropriate 
characteristics for mediators.‖). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Peppet, supra note 15, at 264 (―I agree with the classical conception of neutrality to 
the extent that it recognizes the importance of impartiality.‖).  
 28. William Lucy, The Possibility of Impartiality, 25 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 3, 13 
(2005). 
 29. Cobb & Rifkin, supra note 13, at 42.  
 30. KOVACH, supra note 9, at 212–14.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol34/iss1/4
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―Impartiality,‖ as we define the term, means that the mediator 
does not favor any one party in a mediation over any other 
party. Favoritism might be caused by a prior relationship or 
alliance with a mediation participant or by a personal bias for 
or against a participant based on that person‘s background, 
position, personality or bargaining style. Impartiality thus 
means a freedom from bias regarding the mediation 
participants.
31
 
They define neutrality as meaning ―that the mediator has no personal 
preference that the dispute be resolved in one way rather than 
another. The mediator is there to help the parties identify solutions 
that they find acceptable, not to direct or steer the parties toward 
results he favors.‖32 Stated another way, neutrality is ―a mediator‘s 
ability to be objective while facilitating communication among 
negotiating parties,‖33 and impartiality is ―freedom from favoritism 
and bias in word, action and appearance.‖34  
Despite this lack of clarity in the field, four key elements of 
neutrality are discernable: no conflict of interest; process equality; 
outcome-neutrality; and lack of bias, prejudice, or favoritism toward 
any party.
35
 At a minimum, mediator neutrality is understood to mean 
 
 31. DOUGLAS N. FRENKEL & JAMES H. STARK, THE PRACTICE OF MEDIATION: A VIDEO-
INTEGRATED TEXT 83–84 (2008). 
 32. Id. at 84; see also Susan Oberman, Mediation Theory vs. Practice: What Are We 
Really Doing? Re-Solving a Professional Conundrum, 20 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 775, 802 
(2000). Oberman defines impartiality as ―the ability of the mediator to maintain non-
preferential attitudes and behaviors towards all parties in dispute; it is the ethical responsibility 
of the mediator to withdraw if she or he has lost the ability to remain impartial.‖ Id. She defines 
neutrality as the ―alleged ability of the mediator to remain uninvested in the outcome of a 
dispute, to be aware of any contamination of neutrality, and to withdraw if he or she has lost it.‖ 
Id. 
 33. Susan Nauss Exon, The Effects that Mediator Styles Impose on Neutrality and 
Impartiality Requirements of Mediation, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 577, 580 (2008) (citing JAMES J. 
ALFINI ET AL., MEDIATION THEORY AND PRACTICE 12 (2001)). 
 34. Id. at 581 (quoting DISPUTE RESOLUTION ETHICS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE 68 
(Phyllis Bernard & Bryant Garth eds., 2002)).  
 35. See Susan Douglas, Questions of Mediator Neutrality and Researcher Objectivity: 
Examining Reflexivity as a Response, 20 AUSTRALASIAN DISP. RESOL. J. 56, 57 (2009). This 
study found that mediators are aware of three themes regarding neutrality and per these themes, 
neutrality ―is understood as impartiality, even-handedness and as central to the distinction 
between the process and content or outcome of a dispute.‖ Id. A fourth theme is also important 
to understanding neutrality: ―‗value neutrality‘ or the absence of a situated perspective on 
experience.‖ Id. 
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that the mediator has no pecuniary interest in the subject matter, no 
undisclosed relationship to the parties, and no possibility of personal 
gain.
36
 Avoiding any actual or apparent conflict of interest is 
subsumed in the concept of neutrality. The Uniform Mediation Act 
states that: 
[B]efore accepting a mediation, an individual who is requested 
to serve as a mediator shall: (1) make an inquiry that is 
reasonable under the circumstances to determine whether there 
are any known facts that a reasonable individual would 
consider likely to affect the impartiality of the mediator, 
including a financial or personal interest in the outcome of the 
mediation and an existing or past relationship with a mediation 
party or foreseeable participant in the mediation; and (2) 
disclose any such known fact to the mediation parties as soon 
as is practical before accepting a mediation.
37
  
The Model Standards contain a similar prescription on conflicts: 
[A] mediator shall avoid a conflict of interest or the appearance 
of a conflict of interest during and after a mediation. A conflict 
of interest can arise from involvement by a mediator with the 
subject matter of the dispute or from any relationship between 
a mediator and any mediation participant, whether past or 
present, personal or professional, that reasonably raises a 
question of a mediator‘s impartiality.38  
 
 36. See, e.g., ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR THE PRACTICE OF MEDIATION § 4.2 (Wis. Ass‘n 
of Mediators 1997), available at http://wamediators.org/pubs/ethicalquidelines.html (―As 
WAM members, we disclose to the parties any dealing or relationship that might reasonably 
raise a question about our impartiality. If the parties agree to participate in the mediation 
process after being informed of the circumstances, we proceed unless the conflict of interest 
casts serious doubt on the integrity of the process, in which case we withdraw.‖); see also 
COLORADO MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS § II.A (2000), available at 
http://dola.colorado.gov/dlg/osg/docs/adrmodelstandards.pdf (―The mediator shall advise all 
parties of any prior or existing relationships or other circumstances giving the appearance of or 
creating a possible bias, prejudice, or partiality.‖). 
 37. UNIF. MEDIATION ACT §§ 9(a)(1)-(2) (2003), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/ 
bll/archives/ulc/mediat/2003finaldraft.pdf. 
 38. MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS III(A) (2005), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/dispute/documents/model_standards_conduct_apn12007.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol34/iss1/4
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The source of the mediator‘s fees may compromise neutrality. A 
mediator must disclose any ―monetary, psychological, emotional, 
associational, or authoritative affiliations‖ with any of the parties that 
might arguably cause a conflict of interest.
39
 This aspect of neutrality 
has special consequences for attorney-mediators:  
One major issue for lawyers who alternate between the roles of 
advocate and neutral is the potential for conflicts of interest—
the possibility that a party in a mediated case will be a past or 
future legal client of the mediator-lawyer. This is a particular 
concern in large law firms, where a lawyer-neutral‘s partners 
may be concerned that a single modestly compensated 
mediation will disqualify the entire firm from representing the 
party in a much more lucrative matter. Standards for neutrals 
call for disclosure in such situations.
40
  
A second facet of neutrality is process-based or procedural, 
requiring that the mediator conduct the mediation process in a 
manner that is even-handed.
41
 The Model Standards require a 
mediator to conduct a mediation in a manner that promotes party 
participation and procedural fairness.
42
 ―The mediator‘s task is to 
control the process of the mediation, providing a procedural 
framework within which the parties can decide what their dispute is 
about and how they wish to resolve it.‖43 Process symmetry may be 
manifested by maneuvers such as ensuring an equal number of 
caucuses with the disputants or spending roughly the same amount of 
time with each party. It also means enforcing stated guidelines in a 
 
 39. KOVACH, supra note 9, at 213.  
 40. JAY FOLBERG ET AL., RESOLVING DISPUTES: THEORY, PRACTICE, AND LAW 447 
(2005). 
 41. MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS VI.A (2005), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/dispute/documents/model_standards_conduct_april2007.pdf (―Quality 
of the Process: A. A mediator shall conduct a mediation in accordance with these Standards and 
in a manner that promotes diligence, timeliness, safety, presence of the appropriate participants, 
party participation, procedural fairness, party competency and mutual respect among all 
participants.‖).  
 42. Id.  
 43. Hilary Astor, Mediator Neutrality: Making Sense of Theory and Practice, 16 SOC. & 
LEGAL STUD. 221, 223 (2007); see also Wing, supra note 15, at 94 (―[M]ediators are seen as 
only interested in the process, in ensuring that it is fair and that parties to the dispute are the 
decision-masters on any mutually acceptable agreement formulated.‖). 
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fair manner. For example, if the mediator sets a deadline for the 
submission of written statements or enforces behavioral guidelines, 
the parties expect enforcement to be equal. ―One feature of 
procedural impartiality is that the rules constitutive of some decision-
making process must, at a minimum, favour neither party to the 
dispute-cum-competition or favour or inhibit both equally.‖44  
Expectations of mediator neutrality encompass both procedural 
and outcome impartiality.
45
 Neutrality in mediation is widely 
understood to mean that the mediator does not influence the content 
or outcome of the mediation. The mediator‘s ethical duty to be 
impartial throughout the process applies to her interaction with the 
parties and to the substance of the dispute.
46
 Content-neutrality is 
closely linked to consensual decision-making by the disputants; it 
constrains mediators from usurping party control over choices and 
judgments.
47
 Outcome neutrality requires the mediator to refrain from 
promoting either party‘s interests.48 This component of neutrality also 
means the mediator should not press the parties to reach a resolution 
at all. ―Some would draw a line at content-neutrality, however, when 
the result would be unfair to one of the parties or have detrimental 
effects on individuals with interests that are not represented at the 
table.‖49  
A mediator‘s ethical duty and ability to be outcome-neutral have 
inspired significant debate within the profession.
50
 For years, scholars 
 
 44. Lucy, supra note 28, at 11.  
 45. Id. at 8. 
 46. COOLEY, supra note 6, at 23. 
 47. Taylor, supra note 24, at 218 (―[T]he mediator is not to determine the outcome, but 
allow a process where decisions are made by the participants.‖). 
 48. CHRISTOPHER W. MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS: PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR 
RESOLVING CONFLICT 52 (2d ed. 1996) (―What impartiality and neutrality do signify is that 
mediators can separate their personal opinions about the outcome of the dispute from the 
performance of their duties and focus on ways to help the parties make their own decisions 
without unduly favoring one of them.‖).  
 49. EDWARD BRUNET ET AL., ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE ADVOCATE‘S 
PERSPECTIVE 200 (3d ed. 2006). In certain contexts, mediators have duties that extend beyond 
the immediate parties. In environmental disputes, international conflicts, and family law 
matters, for example, strict neutrality yields to normative consensus and standards to protect 
outside interests.  
 50. See, e.g., Lawrence Susskind, Environmental Mediation and the Accountability 
Problem, 6 VT. L. REV. 1, 46–47 (1981) (asserting that environmental mediators ought to 
accept responsibility for ensuring that agreements are as fair and stable as possible, even though 
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and practitioners have questioned whether a mediator should be a 
mere facilitator of party-initiated outcomes or should assertively 
prevent agreements that are unfair or favor more powerful parties.
51
 
From one perspective, neutral mediators are viewed as being 
interested solely in ensuring a fair process, leaving the disputants to 
determine any mutually agreeable resolution.
52
 An alternative 
philosophy is that mediators may or must interact with the parties 
unequally to account for differences such as resources, power, 
educational level, and financial sophistication.
53
 This debate is less 
about how we define neutrality and more about how neutrality 
meshes with equally valued norms of fairness and justice, process 
legitimacy and quality, and party self-determination.
54
 While it is 
important for mediators to engage in that colloquy, it is not the focus 
of this Article. 
The final element of neutrality, and the one I want to emphasize, 
is the mediator‘s duty to ―avoid bias or the appearance of bias.‖55 
―Impartiality between the parties and neutrality regarding the 
outcome are only two forms of bias. The sum total of the life 
experience of the mediator, the subjective self, enters into each 
mediation and impacts the process and outcome.‖56 The Model 
Standards capture this in Standard II, which states in pertinent part: 
 
―such intervention may make it difficult to retain the appearance of neutrality and the trust of 
the active parties‖); Joseph B. Stulberg, The Theory and Practice of Mediation: A Reply to 
Professor Susskind, 6 VT. L. REV. 85, 86 (1981) (―It is precisely a mediator‘s commitment to 
neutrality which ensures responsible actions on the part of the mediator and permits mediation 
to be an effective, principled dispute settlement procedure.‖); see also Evan M. Rock, 
Mindfulness Meditation, the Cultivation of Awareness, Mediator Neutrality and the Possibility 
of Justice, 6 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 347, 355 (2005) (citing Peppett, supra note 15, at 
255); Sydney E. Bernard et al., The Neutral Mediator: Value Dilemmas in Divorce Mediation, 4 
MEDIATION Q. 61, 66 (1984). 
 51. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Professional Responsibility for Third-Party Neutrals, 11 
ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 129 (1993). 
 52. Kimberlee K. Kovach & Lela P. Love, Mapping Mediation: The Risks of Riskin‟s 
Grid, 3 HARVARD NEGOT. L. REV. 71 (1998); Wing, supra note 15, at 94.  
 53. Bernard et al., supra note 50, at 66–67. 
 54. For example, family mediators must remain neutral as to outcome and impartial 
toward the parties but protect the best interest of children. See Kimberly A. Smoron, Conflicting 
Roles in Child Custody Mediation: Impartiality/Neutrality and the Best Interests of the Child, 
36 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 258, 261 (1998).  
 55. Astor, supra note 11, at 77.  
 56. Oberman, supra note 32, at 819–20 (citing Deborah M. Kolb & Jeffrey Z. Rubin, 
Mediation Through a Disciplinary Prism, in RESEARCH ON NEGOTIATION IN ORGANIZATIONS 
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A. A mediator shall decline a mediation if the mediator cannot 
conduct it in an impartial manner. Impartiality means freedom 
from favoritism, bias or prejudice. 
B. A mediator shall conduct a mediation in an impartial 
manner and avoid conduct that gives the appearance of 
partiality. 
 1. A mediator should not act with partiality or prejudice 
based on any participant‘s personal characteristics, 
background, values and beliefs, or performance at a mediation, 
or any other reason.
57
 
As of 2007, over a dozen states have implemented standards in 
which neutrality is defined as ―freedom from favoritism or bias either 
by word or action, and a commitment to serve all parties as opposed 
to a single party.‖58 Favoritism might be caused by a personal bias for 
or against a participant based on that person‘s background, position, 
personality or bargaining style; as such, impartiality means a freedom 
from bias towards the mediation participants.
59
 For the disputants in 
mediation, a paramount concern is that the mediator has no prejudice 
against them on any level.
60
 
To maintain neutrality, mediators must be aware of their 
assumptions, biases, and judgments about the participants in the 
process, particularly in cases where they have strong reactions to one 
of the parties.
61
 Achieving impartiality requires mediators to have 
―insight into their own perspectives and experiences and [to 
understand] the impact that these have on their relationship with the 
parties in mediation.‖62 ―There remains the concern that the 
mediator‘s ideas and approaches to a problem will intrude and affect 
 
231, 240 (Max H. Bazerman et al. eds., 3d ed. 1991)). 
 57. MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS, Standard II (2005), available at 
http://abanet.org/dispute/documents/model_standards_conduct_april2007.pdf. 
 58. Exon, supra note 33, at 585 (quoting MINN. R. GEN. PRAC. 114 app. I cmt. 1, 
available at http://www.mncourts.gov/rules/general/GRtitleII.htm; STANDARDS OF PRACTICE: 
ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR FULL MEMBERS 4 (Mont. Mediation Ass‘n 1998), available at 
http://mtmediation.org/doc/Full%Ethics%20and%20Quals.pdf).  
 59. FRENKEL & STARK, supra note 31, at 83–84.  
 60. COOLEY, supra note 6, at 28.  
 61. Taylor, supra note 24, at 226. 
 62. Astor, supra note 11, at 77.  
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the direction of the process of mediation and its outcomes, as well as 
the difficulty of monitoring unconscious bias.‖63 
This Article highlights the impartiality dimension of mediator 
neutrality in order to examine the imposing challenge presented by 
one form of bias,
64
 i.e., implicit or unconscious bias. The next Part 
begins with a condensed review of the science of implicit social 
cognition and the phenomenon of implicit bias. It introduces the work 
of ―behavioral realists‖ who import scientific research into legal 
analysis, and concludes with the application of these concepts to the 
mediation process. 
II. IMPLICIT BIAS, BEHAVIORAL REALISM, AND APPLICATION TO 
MEDIATION 
An impressive body of social science research produced over the 
past decades illuminates in new ways how our minds work. Advances 
in experimental psychology provide a deeper understanding of human 
perception, attention, memory, judgment, and decision-making. 
Cognitive social psychology studies persuasively show
65
 that 
 
 63. Id.  
 64. There are many ways that ―bias‖ operates in dispute resolution. See, e.g., Robert S. 
Adler, Flawed Thinking: Addressing Decision Biases in Negotiation, 20 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. 
RESOL. 683 (2005) (arguing that cognitive biases often associated with availability and 
representative and anchoring heuristics can be helpful, but can lead to stereotyping of large 
numbers of people based on limited past experiences; also argues that egocentric bias can affect 
one‘s perception of fairness); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under 
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124 (1974) (contending that by understanding 
the positive and negative aspects of heuristics and biases, one can improve one‘s judgments and 
decisions when faced with uncertainty); John Livingood, Addressing Bias in Conflict and 
Dispute Resolution Settings, DISP. RESOL. J., Nov. 2007–Jan. 2008, at 53, 54–59 (asserting that 
judgment in conflict situations can be affected by four core biases: learned, incident-driven, 
process-driven and attributional); Joel Lee, Overcoming Attribution Bias in Mediation: An NLP 
Perspective, 15 AUSTRALASIAN DISP. RESOL. J. 48 (2004) (arguing that neuro-linguistic 
programming (NLP) can be useful to a mediator in helping parties understand and deal with 
attribution biases). A discussion of these forms of bias in mediation and negotiation is beyond 
the scope of this Article. 
 65. This research has critics and defenders. Some argue that implicit association test data 
do not support the conclusion that implicit bias leads to discriminatory behavior. See Amy L. 
Wax, The Discriminating Mind: Define It, Prove It, 40 CONN. L. REV. 979, 985 (2008) 
(contending that it is not ―proper to equate unconsciously biased mental associations with the 
tendency to engage in unlawful discrimination‖); R. Richard Banks, Jennifer L. Eberhardt & 
Lee Ross, Discrimination and Implicit Bias in a Racially Unequal Society, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 
1169, 1187–88 (2006) (asserting that the Implicit Association Test (IAT) is not significantly 
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unconsciously held attitudes and stereotypes can affect our 
interaction with others and may predict behavior.
66
 This rich reservoir 
of scientific material deserves a more expansive presentation than I 
am able to offer here. What follows is a selective summary of some 
of the fascinating, and often startling, experimental discoveries about 
the insidious operation of unconscious bias. In the interest of space, I 
omit detailed descriptions of experimental design and administration 
and refer readers to the sources for explanations of methodologies 
and statistical analyses.  
Following this summary of implicit bias research, I present the 
work of ―behavioral realists.‖ These legal academics and social 
scientists use social cognition research to measure how legal 
doctrines and institutional processes address discriminatory behavior. 
In contexts such as peremptory challenges, judicial decision-making, 
employment, and jury selection, scholars argue that current 
procedural and substantive legal protections fail to account for the 
 
correlated to discriminatory behavior because subtle behaviors such as eye contact, speech 
errors, and body language do not constitute discriminatory action); Philip E. Tetlock, Cognitive 
Biases and Organizational Correctives: Do Both Disease and Cure Depend on the Politics of 
the Beholder?, 45 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 293 (2000) (arguing that studies should not focus on 
judgmental shortcomings but on the fact that everyone cannot fit in a particular category, and 
that an ideological bias on the part of researchers does not always translate to a ―real-world‖ 
setting); Gregory Mitchell & Philip E. Tetlock, Antidiscrimination Law and the Perils of 
Mindreading, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1023 (2006) (claiming that implicit bias research is invalid and 
should not be used in developing antidiscrimination law). There are rebuttals to this criticism. 
See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Implicit Bias, “Science,” and Antidiscrimination Law, 1 HARV. L. & 
POL‘Y REV. 477 (2007) (discrediting critics such as Mitchell and Tetlock for dismissing 
research unscientifically and subjectively, and further arguing that sufficient evidence exists to 
show that implicit biases lead to discrimination, and that antidiscrimination laws should be used 
to counter implicit bias effects); David L. Faigman et al., A Matter of Fit: The Law of 
Discrimination and the Science of Implicit Bias, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1389, 1389–99, 1426–29 
(2007) (arguing that expert testimony regarding research on implicit bias should be admissible 
in Title VII discrimination cases as a general background of implicit bias to give triers of fact 
understanding and context because ―studies using a variety of measures and techniques have 
demonstrated the effects of implicit bias on judgments and behavior, creating a broad research 
base that spans several social scientific disciplines including psychology, sociology, and 
organizational behavior‖; therefore ―it is a mistake to conflate the existence of implicit bias 
with any one measure such as the IAT,‖ or Implicit Association Test, and ―it is a mistake to 
assume that critiques of one particular measure such as the IAT undermine the entire body of 
evidence showing the existence of implicit stereotypes and bias and their impact on judgments 
and behavior in the workplace‖). 
 66. Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific 
Foundations, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 945, 954–55 (2006). 
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operation of unconscious biases. With evidence that implicit attitude 
measures reveal much more bias favoring advantaged groups than do 
explicit measures, adherents of behavioral realism advocate legal 
reform to adequately address prejudiced behavior. I examine the 
mediation process through a behavioral realism lens and suggest that 
mediators regularly fail to act in unbiased ways. 
A. Implicit Bias Research 
Implicit social cognition is ―a broad theoretical category that 
integrates and reinterprets established research findings, guides 
searches for new empirical phenomena, prompts attention to 
presently undeveloped research methods, and suggests applications in 
various practical settings.‖67 Implicit social cognitionists posit that we 
can learn more about stereotypes and prejudice when we examine 
their unconscious operations. For example, experiments examining 
the causal relationship between unconscious stereotypes and biases in 
perception and memory have shined new light on social interactions 
and led theorists to recommend corrective actions to counteract the 
pervasiveness of unconscious biases.
68
 Mental processes such as 
implicit memory, implicit attitudes, implicit self-esteem, implicit 
perception, and implicit stereotypes operate outside conscious 
attention and thereby unconsciously influence judgment.
69
 ―The term 
implicit, contrasted with explicit, is used to capture a distinction 
variously labeled as unconscious versus conscious, unaware versus 
aware, and indirect versus direct.‖70 The most commonly used 
techniques for studying implicit social cognition are priming tasks 
with rapid response time measures and the Implicit Association Test 
(IAT), which is described below.
71
  
 
 67. Anthony G. Greenwald & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition: Attitudes, 
Self-Esteem, and Stereotypes, 102 PSYCHOL. REV. 4, 4 (1995).  
 68. Mahzarin R. Banaji & Anthony G. Greenwald, Implicit Stereotyping and Prejudice, in 
7 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PREJUDICE: THE ONTARIO SYMPOSIUM 55, 56 (Mark P. Zanna & James 
M. Olson eds., 1994). 
 69. Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 66, at 947. 
 70. Mahzarin R. Banaji, Curtis Hardin & Alexander J. Rothman, Implicit Stereotyping in 
Person Judgment, 65 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 272 n.1 (1993).  
 71. Kristin A. Lane, Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition and 
Law, 3 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 427, 428, 431 (2007).  
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Implicit bias refers to:  
[A]n aspect of the new science of unconscious mental 
processes that has substantial bearing on discrimination law. 
Theories of implicit bias contrast with the ―naïve‖ 
psychological conception of social behavior, which views 
human actors as being guided solely by explicit beliefs and 
their conscious intentions to act. A belief is explicit if it is 
consciously endorsed. An intention to act is conscious if the 
actor is aware of taking an action for a particular reason. . . . In 
contrast, the science of implicit cognition suggests that actors 
do not always have conscious, intentional control over the 
processes of social perception, impression formation, and 
judgment that motivate their actions.
72
 
An overview of implicit social cognition research draws four main 
conclusions about the collective findings: (1) there is a variance, 
sometimes wide, between implicit and explicit cognition; (2) there is 
a discernable, pervasive and strong favoritism for one‘s own group, 
as well as for socially valued groups; (3) implicit cognitions, often 
more accurately than explicit, predict behavior; (4) implicit social 
cognitions are not impervious to change.
73
  
Two concepts are key to the study of implicit social cognition: 
attitude (or preference) and stereotype (or belief).
74
 Attitudes can be 
defined as dispositions toward things, such as people, places, and 
policies.
75
 Stated another way, ―an attitude [is] an evaluative 
disposition—that is, the tendency to like or dislike, or to act 
favorably or unfavorably toward, someone or something.‖76 Explicit 
attitude expression can come in the form of action, such as selecting 
something we like or rejecting something we dislike.
77
 Implicit 
attitudes are ―introspectively unidentified (or inaccurately identified) 
traces of past experience that mediate favorable or unfavorable 
 
 72. Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 66, at 946. 
 73. Lane, Kang & Banaji, supra note 71, at 431–38. 
 74. Id. at 429. 
 75. Greenwald & Banaji, supra note 67, at 7. 
 76. Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 66, at 948. 
 77. Id.  
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feeling, thought, or action toward social objects.‖78 For example, 
―[a]n implicit attitude toward B may be indirectly indicated by a 
(direct) measure of evaluation of A, when A and B have some 
relation that predisposes the implicit influence.‖79 ―Halo effect‖ 
research provides another example: physically attractive men and 
women ―are judged to be kinder, more interesting, more sociable, 
happier, stronger, of better character, and more likely to hold 
prestigious jobs‖ by operation of an ―objectively irrelevant attribute 
[physical attractiveness] that influences evaluative judgment on 
various other dimensions.‖80  
A stereotype ―is a mental association between a social group or 
category and a trait.‖81 Stereotyping is ―the application of beliefs 
about the attributes of a group to judge an individual member of that 
group.‖82 A person‘s attitude toward someone or something is a 
consistent positive or negative response to an object.
83
 On the other 
hand,  
a stereotype may encompass beliefs with widely diverging 
evaluative implications. For example, the stereotype of 
members of a certain group (e.g., cheerleaders) may 
 
 78. Greenwald & Banaji, supra note 67, at 8. 
 79. Id.  
 80. Id. at 9 (citing Karen Dion, Ellen Berscheid & Elaine Walster, What is Beautiful is 
Good, 24 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 207 (1972)). The act of voting presents another 
example of implicit attitude. Voting for Obama because you know you like his beliefs and 
policies would be an explicit attitude expression. However, ―a vote might function as an 
implicit attitude indicator—that is, an action that indicates favor or disfavor toward some object 
but is not understood by the actor as expressing that attitude. For example, a voter may vote for 
a particular candidate even though the voter knows nothing other than the candidate‘s name 
shares initial letters with the voter‘s name. In such a case, the vote can be understood, at least in 
part, as an implicit expression of the voter‘s self-favorable attitude.‖ Greenwald & Krieger, 
supra note 66, at 948. Reliable research finds that most people have a positive attitude about 
themselves. Thus, ―an expectable form of implicit attitude effect is that novel objects that are 
invested with an association to self should be positively evaluated.‖ Greenwald & Banaji, supra 
note 67, at 10. Continuing with the voting example, even if you know nothing about Obama‘s 
sister, you might like his sibling. ―This favorable attitude is an implicit indicator of attitude 
toward the candidate. Here, the ‗implicit‘ designation indicates that the attitude expressed 
toward the candidate determined the attitude toward the relative, even though the liking or 
disliking for the relative may be experienced as an independent attitude.‖ Greenwald & Krieger, 
supra note 66, at 948–49. 
 81. Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 66, at 949. 
 82. Banaji & Greenwald, supra note 68, at 58. 
 83. Greenwald & Banaji, supra note 67, at 7. 
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simultaneously include the traits of being physically attractive 
(positive) and unintelligent (negative). Stereotypes guide 
judgment and action to the extent that a person acts toward 
another as if the other possesses traits included in the 
stereotype.
84
  
Stereotypes are activated automatically, generally leading to the 
presumption that ―the operation of the stereotype or prejudice [is] 
unintended by the research participants (i.e., not deliberate), either 
because they are unaware of certain critical aspects of the procedure 
or because they are operating under conditions that make it difficult 
to deliberately base responses on specific beliefs or evaluations.‖85 
For example, a 1983 experiment conducted by Samuel Gaertner and 
John McLaughlin provided one illustration of stereotype activation, 
demonstrating that subjects more quickly identified word pairs if they 
were consistent rather than inconsistent with African American 
stereotypes (e.g., Blacks-lazy vs. Blacks-ambitious).
86
  
More recently, Mahzarin Banaji and Curtis Hardin conducted two 
priming task experiments on gender stereotyping.
87
 Subjects saw 
gender-related primes (e.g., mother, father) or neutral primes (e.g., 
parent, student) followed by target words. Subjects in the first 
experiment were asked to respond as to whether the following target 
pronoun, either gender-related (e.g., he, she) or neutral (e.g., it, me), 
was male or female. Participants were able to respond faster to 
pronouns that were consistent with the gender stereotype of the 
prime; this result occurred independently of explicit beliefs about 
gender stereotypes.
88
 The second experiment asked participants only 
to identify whether the target word was a pronoun or not a pronoun, 
but still resulted in similar effects of gender stereotyping.
89
 These 
 
 84. Id. at 14. 
 85. Irene V. Blair, The Malleability of Automatic Stereotypes and Prejudice, 6 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 242, 243 (2002). 
 86. Id. at 242 (citing Samuel L. Gaertner & John P. McLaughlin, Racial Stereotypes: 
Associations and Ascriptions of Positive and Negative Characteristics, 46 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 23 
(1983)). 
 87. See Mahzarin R. Banaji & Curtis D. Hardin, Automatic Stereotyping, 7 PSYCHOL. SCI. 
136 (1996). 
 88. Id. at 136–39. 
 89. Id. at 139–40. 
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experiments ―demonstrated that judgments of targets that follow[ed] 
gender-congruent primes are made faster than judgments of targets 
that follow[ed] gender-incongruent primes,‖ showing that gender 
information imparted by words can automatically influence 
judgment, even in unrelated tasks.
90
 Other studies bolster the finding 
that ―[p]eople may often not be aware of what they are doing, they 
might even intend to be doing something else; perhaps worst of all, 
the operation of stereotypes and prejudice may be outside of their 
control.‖91 
Automatic activation of stereotypes ―provides the basis for 
implicit stereotyping.‖92 ―Implicit stereotypes are the introspectively 
unidentified (or inaccurately identified) traces of past experience that 
mediate attributions of qualities to members of a social category.‖93 
In one study, Mahzarin Banaji and Anthony Greenwald examined the 
relationship between implicit stereotypes and gender.
94
 When testing 
participants‘ recognition of famous names, participants were more 
likely to falsely identify a male name as famous than they were to 
falsely identify a female name as famous. The false-fame effect was 
substantial when the names were male but weaker when the names 
were female, demonstrating an implicit indicator of the stereotype 
that associates maleness with fame (and achievement).
95
 Researchers 
observe that stereotypes are often expressed implicitly in the behavior 
of people who expressly disavow the stereotype. Because race and 
gender stereotypes have been studied more often, they provide the 
―most persuasive evidence for implicit stereotyping.‖96  
―Implicit biases are discriminatory biases based on implicit 
attitudes or implicit stereotypes. Implicit biases are especially 
 
 90. Id. at 140. In another experiment, researchers discovered that by activating abstract 
knowledge about beliefs associated with men and women, such as dependence and 
aggressiveness, subjects judged male and female targets more harshly when the targets‘ group 
membership stereotypically matched (e.g., after the subject‘s exposure to dependence primes, 
the subject will judge the female target to be more dependent). Banaji, Hardin & Rothman, 
supra note 70, at 272.  
 91. Blair, supra note 85, at 242.  
 92. Greenwald & Banaji, supra note 67, at 15. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Mahzarin R. Banaji & Anthony G. Greenwald, Implicit Gender Stereotyping in 
Judgments of Fame, 68 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 181 (1995). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Greenwald & Banaji, supra note 67, at 15. 
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intriguing, and also especially problematic, because they can produce 
behavior that diverges from a person‘s avowed or endorsed beliefs or 
principles.‖97 The existence of stereotypes and biases does not mean 
that a person necessarily holds consciously prejudicial beliefs. 
Stereotypes and prejudices unconsciously and naturally form 
―through ordinary biases rooted in memory‖ to simplify cognitive 
processes.
98
 To a varying degree, all of us are subject to the operation 
of implicit stereotyping and prejudice.
99
 ―The best of intentions do 
not and cannot override the unfolding of unconscious processes, for 
the triggers of automatic thought, feeling, and behavior live and 
breathe outside conscious awareness and control.‖100  
In large part, implicit social cognition research has advanced 
because of the development and accessibility of the Implicit 
Association Test (IAT), an instrument that produces an implicit-
attitude measure based on response speeds in two four-category 
tasks.
101
 Since 1998, self-administered IAT demonstrations have been 
available online.
102
 The most widely used version is the ―Race IAT‖ 
which measures implicit attitudes toward African Americans (AA) 
relative to European Americans (EA).
103
 
Using the IAT, social scientists have found that most Americans 
exhibit a ―strong and automatic positive evaluation of White 
 
 97. Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 66, at 951. 
 98. Mahzarin R. Banaji & R. Bhaskar, Implicit Stereotypes and Memory: The Bounded 
Rationality of Social Beliefs, in MEMORY, BRAIN, AND BELIEF 139, 167 (Daniel L. Schacter & 
Elaine Scarry eds., 2000). 
 99. Id. at 143.  
 100. Id. at 142–43.  
 101. See Anthony G. Greenwald, Mahzarin R. Banaji & Brian A. Nosek, Understanding 
and Using the Implicit Association Test: I. An Improved Scoring Algorithm, 85 J. PERSONALITY 
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 197 (2003). 
 102. PROJECT IMPLICIT, https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2010). 
 103. The IAT works as follows: ―[R]espondents first practice distinguishing AA from EA 
faces by responding to faces from one of these two categories with the press of a computer key 
on the left side of the keyboard and to those of the other category on the right side of the 
keyboard. Respondents next practice distinguishing pleasant-meaning from unpleasant-meaning 
words in a similar manner. The next two tasks, given in a randomly determined order, use all 
four categories (AA faces, EF faces, pleasant-meaning words, and unpleasant-meaning words). 
In one of these two tasks, the IAT calls for one response (say, pressing a left-side key) when the 
respondent sees AA faces or pleasant words, whereas EA faces and unpleasant words call for 
the other response (right-side key). In the remaining task, EA faces share a response with 
pleasant words and AA faces with unpleasant words.‖ Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 66, at 
952–53. 
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Americans and a relatively negative evaluation of African 
Americans.‖104  
An analysis of data archived from many years of web-accessed 
IAT interactive demonstrations compared the level of favoritism 
toward advantaged versus disadvantaged groups revealed by implicit 
and explicit measures. Over two million people have taken the IAT; 
90 percent have been American.
105
 Eighty-eight percent of white test 
takers have manifested implicit bias in favor of Whites and against 
Blacks.
106
 Over 80 percent of heterosexuals manifested implicit bias 
in favor of straights over gays and lesbians.
107
 Non-Arab and non-
Muslim test takers manifested strong implicit bias against 
Muslims.
108
 These results are in sharp contrast to self-reported 
attitudes.
109
 The following generalizations are apparent as to these 
self-selected users: explicit measures show much greater evidence for 
attitudinal impartiality or neutrality, and the IAT measures revealed 
greater bias in favor of the advantaged group. Implicit attitude 
measures reveal far more bias favoring advantaged groups than do 
explicit measures.
110
 Interestingly, only African Americans failed to 
show substantial pro-EA race bias on the Race IAT.
111
 From this, one 
can draw the conclusion that ―any non-African American subgroup of 
the United States population will reveal high proportions of persons 
showing statistically noticeable implicit race bias in favor of EA 
relative to AA.‖112  
Becca Levy and Mahzarin Banaji surveyed research that utilized 
the IAT and implicit priming to measure automatic attitudes and 
stereotypes related to age.
113
 Based on 68,144 tests that included 
people along a wide spectrum of ages, Levy and Banaji offered three 
 
 104. Nilanjana Dasgupta et al., Automatic Preference for White Americans: Eliminating the 
Familiarity Explanation, 36 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 316, 316 (2000).  
 105. Shankar Vedantam, See No Bias, WASH. POST MAG., Jan. 23, 2005, at 12, 15.  
 106. Id. 
 107. Id.  
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 66, at 955. 
 111. Id. at 956. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Becca R. Levy & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Ageism, in AGEISM: STEREOTYPING 
AND PREJUDICE AGAINST OLDER PERSONS 49, 51–52 (Todd D. Nelson ed., 2002). 
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key findings.
114
 First, ageism, defined as ―an alteration in feeling, 
belief, or behavior in response to an individual‘s or group‘s perceived 
chronological age[,] . . . can operate without conscious awareness, 
control, or intention to harm.‖115 Levy and Banaji found implicit 
ageism to be among the largest negative implicit attitudes observed, 
even larger than the anti-black attitude among white Americans.
116
 
Second, explicit age attitudes toward the elderly are negative, but 
implicit age attitudes are far more negative overall.
117
 Third, a 
peculiar feature of implicit ageism is that it does not appear to vary as 
a function of age, since both older and younger subjects tend to have 
negative implicit attitudes toward the old and positive implicit 
attitudes toward the young.
118
 The authors argue that ageism occurs 
implicitly and that all people are implicated in it. ―Once age 
stereotypes have been acquired, they are likely to be automatically 
triggered by the presence of an elderly person.‖119  
When implicit and explicit attitudes toward the same object vary, 
the discrepancy between the two is referred to as dissociation. This is 
often seen in attitudes toward stigmatized groups defined by age, 
race, sexual orientation, and disability.
120
 Experiments show that 
implicit expressions of beliefs and attitudes are unrelated to explicit 
versions of the same. Two studies explored the use of the IAT ―to 
chart the emergence of implicit attitudes in early and middle 
childhood.‖121 The first study examined white American children‘s 
attitudes of blacks and Japanese.
122
 The second also tested for explicit 
and implicit race biases but used a sample from a rural Japanese town 
where participants had little exposure to out-groups.
123
 Generally, 
implicit and explicit biases existed at the earliest ages tested, but 
dissociation began around age ten or middle childhood as 
 
 114. Id. at 54. 
 115. Id. at 50.  
 116. Id. at 54–55.  
 117. Id. at 55. 
 118. Id.  
 119. Id. at 64. 
 120. Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 66, at 949. 
 121. Yarrow Dunham et al., From American City to Japanese Village: A Cross-Cultural 
Investigation of Implicit Race Attitudes, 77 CHILD DEV. 1268, 1270 (2006). 
 122. Id. at 1270–71. 
 123. Id. at 1274. 
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participants‘ explicit bias began to dissipate.124 Researchers 
consistently observed dissociation between conscious and 
unconscious social judgment.
125
  
Significantly, implicit bias predicts individually discriminatory 
behaviors.
126
 Studies substantiate that ―implicit measures of bias have 
relatively greater predictive validity than explicit measures in 
situations that are socially sensitive, like racial interactions, where 
impression-management processes might inhibit people from 
expressing negative attitudes or unattractive stereotypes.‖127 An 
experiment featuring doctors making patient assessments provides an 
example of discriminatory behavior predicted by implicit bias 
measures.
128
 Physicians with stronger implicit anti-black attitudes and 
stereotypes were not as likely to prescribe a medical procedure for 
African Americans compared to white Americans with the same 
medical profiles.
129
 In addition, implicit measures are relatively better 
predictors of ―spontaneous behaviors such as eye contact, seating 
distance, and other such actions that communicate social warmth or 
discomfort.‖130 ―Those who possess stronger negative attitudes 
toward a stigmatized group tend to exhibit more negative behaviors 
(e.g., blinking) and less positive behaviors (e.g., smiling) when 
interacting with a member of that group.‖131  
Researchers conclude:  
The exposure of stereotyped knowledge in these studies 
represents an experimental analog of the countless ways in 
everyday life by which stereotyped information is continuously 
made available. . . . [I]mplicit stereotyping effects undermine 
the current belief about the role of consciousness in 
guaranteeing equality in the treatment of individuals 
irrespective of sex, class, color, and national origin. . . . 
Implicit stereotyping critically compromises the efficacy of 
 
 124. Id. at 1270, 1274–76. 
 125. Banaji & Bhaskar, supra note 98, at 146.  
 126. Lane, Kang & Banaji, supra note 71, at 436.  
 127. Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 66, at 954–55. 
 128. Lane, Kang & Banaji, supra note 71, at 430. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 66, at 955. 
 131. Lane, Kang & Banaji, supra note 71, at 436.  
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―good intention‖ in avoiding stereotyping and points to the 
importance of efforts to change the material conditions within 
which (psychological) stereotyping processes emerge and 
thrive.
132
  
B. Behavioral Realism  
With so much laboratory evidence to support findings in implicit 
social cognition, many commentators have argued that we should 
consider the legal implications of this new science.
133
 Over twenty 
years ago legal scholar Charles Lawrence called attention to the 
effects of unconscious racism in an oft-cited law review article, 
noting that ―a large part of the behavior that produces racial 
discrimination is influenced by unconscious racial motivation.‖134 
Social science research has spawned a new generation of academics 
who question whether existing legal doctrines realistically account 
for the operation of implicit social cognition on human actors.
135
  
 
 132. Banaji, Hardin & Rothman, supra note 70, at 280.  
 133. Several authors have surveyed research and experiments on metacognitive processes 
to show how awareness, control, and intentionality (features of consciousness) relate to the 
formation of beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors. They argue that research on implicit social 
processes, particularly data on influences outside conscious awareness, control, and intention, 
may drive re-conceptualization of the legal notion of intention as it relates to discrimination. 
See, e.g., Lane, Kang & Banaji, supra note 71; Banaji & Bhaskar, supra note 98; Linda 
Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment Discrimination Law: 
Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 997 (2006); Mahzarin R. Banaji & 
Nilanjana Dasgupta, The Consciousness of Social Beliefs: A Program of Research on 
Stereotyping and Prejudice, in METACOGNITION: COGNITIVE AND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS 157, 
167 (Vincent Y. Yzerbyt et al. eds., 1998).  
 134. Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with 
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 322 (1987).  
 135. See generally Jennifer S. Hunt, Implicit Bias and Hate Crimes: A Psychological 
Framework and Critical Race Theory Analysis, in SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS IN LEGAL DECISION 
MAKING: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 247, 255 (Richard L. Wiener et al. eds., 2007) 
(arguing that implicit stereotypes and prejudice may ―tip the scale‖ in triggering hate crimes by 
causing hostile interpretations, increasing the likelihood of categorizing an individual as a 
member of a stigmatized group, activating aggressive behavioral tendencies, and/or lowering 
the decision threshold for aggressive behavior); Antony Page, Unconscious Bias and the Limits 
of Director Independence, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 237 (arguing that rules regarding director 
independence are flawed because they do not account for sources of bias, especially 
unconscious bias); Sara R. Benson, Reviving the Disparate Impact Doctrine to Combat 
Unconscious Discrimination: A Study of Chin v. Runnels, 31 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 43, 58–59 
(2005) (arguing that the intent doctrine should be struck and the disparate impact doctrine 
should be reinstated in Equal Protection cases to combat implicit discrimination). 
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In Trojan Horses of Race, an exposition on selected findings in 
social cognition research, Jerry Kang describes ―‗racial mechanics‘—
the ways in which race alters intrapersonal, interpersonal, and 
intergroup interactions.‖136 With an emphasis on implicit bias 
material, Kang urges that ―it is time for a new ‗behavioral realist‘ 
approach, which draws on the traditions of legal realism and 
behavioral science.‖137 The term ―behavioral realism‖ was coined by 
a collection of academics to identify a collaboration of legal scholars 
and social cognitionists that ―seeks to apply the best model of human 
behavior that science has made available to questions of law and 
policy.‖138 The idea of behavioral realism is that law and 
jurisprudence should be consistent with accepted interpretations of 
behavioral science.
139
 One example of this type of collaboration is 
Kang and Banaji‘s proposal to apply implicit social cognition 
research to create a new framework for affirmative action, using a 
methodology that ―forces the law to confront an increasingly accurate 
description of human decision making and behavior, as provided by 
the social, biological, and physical sciences.‖140 Kang and Banaji 
contend, ―[b]ehavioral realism identifies naïve theories of human 
behavior . . . [and] juxtaposes these theories against the best scientific 
knowledge available to expose gaps between assumptions embedded 
in law and reality described by science. When behavioral realism 
identifies a substantial gap, the law should be changed to comport 
with science.‖141  
A number of scholars have employed a behavioral realist 
approach to evaluate legal doctrines that require a showing of explicit 
 
 136. Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1493 (2005). 
 137. Id. at 1494 n.21. 
 138. Id. 
 139. See, e.g., Dale Larson, Unconsciously Regarded as Disabled: Implicit Bias and the 
Regarded-As Prong of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 56 UCLA L. REV. 451, 476, 484–87 
(2008) (citing a study that found ―[p]reference for people without disabilities compared to 
people with disabilities was among the strongest implicit and explicit effects across the social 
group domains,‖ and concluding that amendments to the Americans with Disabilities Act, 
which would reinstate a broader definition of a key element of actionable discrimination, are an 
important step forward in protecting against disability discrimination resulting from implicit 
bias). 
 140. Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of 
“Affirmative Action,” 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1063, 1064–65 (2006). 
 141. Id. at 1065. 
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bias and conscious racial motivation. In the area of employment 
discrimination law, Linda Krieger and Susan Fiske assert that 
requirements based on intentionality and consciously discriminatory 
motivations are out of sync with empirical data from psychological 
science.
142
 Relying on studies showing commonly held gender 
stereotypes and research indicating that implicit stereotypes remain in 
people who expressly hold egalitarian views, David Faigman, 
Nilanjana Dasgupta, and Cecilia Ridgeway argue that employment 
discrimination law requires new interpretations relying on more than 
explicit motivations.
143
  
In articles addressing juror and judicial decision-making, authors 
present scientific research to show that implicit bias affects 
courtroom proceedings, suggesting that judges who prohibit 
references to race or other social characteristics during the 
proceedings are actually allowing discrimination to continue rather 
than helping to stop it.
144
 Judges who strive to create a prejudice-free 
courtroom face an additional quandary. Studies confirm that 
unconscious bias may explain, at least in part, disparities in judicial 
decision-making, such as with convictions and sentencing.
145
 
Concerned with the impact of implicit bias in the process of creating 
a fair cross-section of jurors, one judge recognized that racial 
dynamics played out in jury deliberations, but she was frustrated in 
her attempts to remove prejudiced jurors from the pool.
146
 Looking at 
 
 142. Krieger & Fiske, supra note 133, at 1061–62.  
 143. Faigman et al., supra note 65, at 1434 (concluding that expert testimony regarding 
research on implicit bias should be admissible in Title VII discrimination cases to provide a 
general background of implicit bias and give triers of fact understanding and context, but not 
for testimony that implicit bias influenced an employment decision in a specific case). 
 144. See Jody Armour, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Helping Legal Decisionmakers Break 
the Prejudice Habit, in CRITICAL RACE REALISM: INTERSECTIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY, RACE, AND 
LAW 11 (Gregory S. Parks et al. eds., 2008). 
 145. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 
84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1202 (2009). The authors found that the white judges in their 
study may have been compensating for unconscious racial biases in their decision-making, at 
least when the defendant‘s race was clearly identified. Id. at 1223. However, the black judges in 
the study had a greater propensity to convict the African American defendant, perhaps, as the 
authors speculate, because ―[b]lack judges . . . might have been less concerned with appearing 
to favor the black defendant than the white judges.‖ Id. at 1224.  
 146. Janet Bond Arterton, Unconscious Bias and the Impartial Jury, 40 CONN. L. REV. 
1023, 1030 (2008) (―The harsh reality for judges conducting voir dire aimed at seating only fair 
and impartial jurors is that the jurors themselves may not be able to assist.‖); see also Turner v. 
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peremptory challenges, Anthony Page argues that the current three-
step Batson approach
147
 is inadequate to address the phenomenon of 
racially motivated challenges in jury selection.
148
 The Batson 
approach requires that the challenging lawyer actually be conscious 
of her reason for striking, but research shows that unconscious bias 
can easily alter our perceptions of others.
149
 Page‘s piece, along with 
other social science articles, was cited by Justice Breyer in Miller-El 
v. Dretke, a case in which the Supreme Court concluded that a 
prosecutor‘s use of peremptory challenges to strike several black 
jurors constituted purposeful discrimination.
150
 Justice Breyer 
commented that ―[s]ubtle forms of bias are automatic, unconscious, 
and unintentional,‖151 operating outside the knowledge of the person 
acting in a biased manner.  
C. Application to Mediation  
Unlike judges, mediators lack the authority to render binding 
judgments. Nevertheless, they may have significant influence on 
individual lives. A mediator‘s actions, judgments, strategic choices, 
and interactions with the disputants have an undeniable impact on the 
substance of the mediation and the results of the mediation process. 
In her book on mediator behavior, Deborah Kolb described her 
 
Stime, 222 P.3d 1243 (Wash. 2009) (holding that the jurors‘ racially biased conduct in regards 
to a Japanese lawyer supported grounds for a new trial); Martha Neil, New Trial Sought After 
Jurors Mock Lawyer‟s Heritage, ABA JOURNAL (Jan. 15, 2008, 4:34 PM), http://www.aba 
journal.com/news/new_trial_sought_after_jurors_mock_lawyers_heritage (Washington lawyer 
sought new trial after jurors mocked his Japanese heritage during deliberations). 
 147. In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), the Supreme Court provided a three step 
approach for constitutional claims regarding the use of peremptory challenges. The first step 
requires the defendant to raise the inference that the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to 
exclude possible jurors based on race. Id. at 96. In the second step, the prosecution has the 
burden of producing a race-neutral explanation for the exclusion of the jurors. Id. at 97. In the 
third step, the trial court must determine if the defendant has proven purposeful discrimination. 
Id. at 98.  
 148. Antony Page, Batson‟s Blind-Spot: Unconscious Stereotyping and the Peremptory 
Challenge, 85 B.U. L. REV. 155 (2005). 
 149. ―[T]he problem with Batson is its inability to address the honest, well-intentioned 
lawyer who nevertheless still discriminates.‖ Id. at 179 (emphasis added). The lawyer‘s lack of 
self-awareness may lead to peremptory challenges being exercised in a discriminatory manner 
even though the lawyer states, and believes, she has a non-discriminatory reason. Id. at 234–35. 
 150. Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 265–66 (2005). 
 151. Id. at 268 (Breyer, J., concurring) (internal quotations omitted). 
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observations of labor mediators during several mediations.
152
 She 
observed two contrasting types of mediator behavior, leading her to 
classify mediators as either ―orchestrators‖ or ―dealmakers‖.153 
Orchestrators tended to require that the parties take more 
responsibility for negotiating, designing settlement proposals, and 
convincing their colleagues to accept a given settlement.
154
 
Dealmakers, on the other hand, saw themselves as responsible for 
creating, pushing, and ―selling‖ an ultimate settlement to the 
parties.
155
 Mediators in Kolb‘s study admitted to ―manipulat[ing]‖ the 
parties to certain outcomes.
156
 Kolb observed mediators using ―direct 
persuasion . . . resulting in a deal that bears the imprint of the 
mediator as much as it does the parties.‖157 
This spectrum of mediator behavior has been described in various 
ways. Leonard Riskin‘s well-known grid situates mediators within a 
―facilitative-evaluative/broad-narrow‖ framework.158 Ellen Waldman 
uses ―Norm-Generating,‖ ―Norm-Educating,‖ and ―Norm-
Advocating‖ terminology.159 Hilary Astor compares a ―robust‖ 
approach, in which the mediator is ―assertive, active, and 
interventionist,‖ to a ―minimalist‖ approach that entails convening, 
stimulating information flow, and identifying options.
160
 For every 
mediator who argues that a facilitative model is the better or 
―correct‖ approach, another advocates a more directive approach in 
fulfilling duties.
161
 By analyzing mediators in practice, observers 
 
 152. DEBORAH M. KOLB, THE MEDIATORS (1983). 
 153. Id. at 25. 
 154. Id. at 34–41, 42–43. 
 155. Id. at 34–42. 
 156. Id. at 41. 
 157. Id. at 42. 
 158. Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding Mediators‟ Orientations, Strategies, and 
Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed, 1 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 7, 16–35 (1996); Leonard L. 
Riskin, Decisionmaking in Mediation: The New Old Grid and The New New Grid System, 79 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 12–13 (2003) (proposing substituting ―directive‖ and ―elicitive‖ for 
―evaluative‖ and ―facilitative‖). 
 159. Ellen A. Waldman, The Challenge of Certification: How to Ensure Mediator 
Competence While Preserving Diversity, 30 U.S.F. L. REV. 723, 728–43 (1996).  
 160. Astor, supra note 11, at 75–76. 
 161. Compare Kimberlee K. Kovach & Lela P. Love, ―Evaluative” Mediation is an 
Oxymoron, 14 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 31 (1996) (―An essential characteristic of 
mediation is facilitated negotiation. . . . ‗Evaluative‘ mediation is an oxymoron. It jeopardizes 
neutrality because a mediator‘s assessment invariably favors one side over the other.‖), with 
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have concluded that evaluative mediators cross the neutrality line in 
ways that facilitative practitioners do not.
162
 It is when mediators 
move from ―educative‖ and ―rational-analytic‖ roles to ―therapeutic‖ 
and ―normative-evaluative‖ roles ―that an ethics dilemma regarding 
neutrality and impartiality may arise.‖163  
Exoneration of facilitative mediators from neutrality breaches, 
however, may be too generous. Under the assumption that ―mediators 
themselves routinely and unabashedly engage in manipulation and 
deception to foster settlements,‖ James Coben argues that ―[t]his is 
not simply a matter of mediator style—the [much-discussed] 
distinction between facilitative and evaluative approaches.‖164 
Despite neutrality constraints, Coben asserts that mediators ―are 
directly involved in influencing disputants toward settlement.‖165  
Mediator partiality is manifested in subtle ways.
166
 Two studies 
reveal a significant disconnect between the articulated practice goal 
of neutrality and the actual techniques and strategies of mediators. In 
the first study, empirical research into community mediation in 
neighbor disputes showed that mediators (paid staff and trained 
volunteers) found it difficult to ignore ―personal bias and evaluations 
of the worthiness of particular claims and disputants.‖167 Mediators 
confessed to being so angry or frustrated with a disputant that on 
occasion ―they felt they could not even make a pretence at remaining 
neutral.‖168 Instead of being a rare occurrence, mediators stated their 
 
Donald T. Weckstein, In Praise of Party Empowerment—and of Mediator Activism, 33 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 501, 504 (1997) (―When consistent with the parties‘ expectations and the 
mediator‘s qualifications, activist intervention by the mediator should be encouraged rather than 
condemned.‖).  
 162. Linda Mulcahy, The Possibilities and Desirability of Mediator Neutrality—Towards 
an Ethic of Partiality?, 10 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 505, 510–11 (2001). 
 163. Taylor, supra note 24, at 221. 
 164. James R. Coben, Mediation‟s Dirty Little Secret: Straight Talk About Mediator 
Manipulation and Deception, 2 ALTERNATIVE DISP. RESOL. EMP. 4 (2004). 
 165. Id. at 5 (citing CHRISTOPHER MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS: PRACTICAL 
STRATEGIES FOR RESOLVING CONFLICT 327 (2d ed. 1996)); see also Astor, supra note 11, at 74 
(―Significant attacks on mediator neutrality have come from academics who have pointed out, 
trenchantly and repeatedly, that mediators are not neutral. Research has clearly demonstrated 
that mediators do inject their own values into mediation.‖). 
 166. Mulcahy, supra note 162, at 511. 
 167. Id. at 516. 
 168. Id. at 516–17.  
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reactions were common.
169
 Their mediation training ―assumed that 
they could keep such negative evaluations of the disputants at 
bay.‖170 However, the mediators felt constrained by an expectation of 
neutrality, as the expectation ―was impossible to achieve‖ and ―made 
them feel as though they were constantly doomed to failure.‖171  
A second study showed that mediators influence the content and 
outcome of mediations by instigating party engagement at certain 
times in the process to make certain outcomes more likely.
172
 This 
study looked at divorce mediations, analyzing data from forty-five 
mediation sessions which covered fifteen cases handled by three 
mediators.
173
 Researchers found that mediators directed the process 
towards the outcomes they favored.
174
 ―The pressure that the 
mediator exerts toward the favored and against the disfavored 
outcome is largely managed by differentially creating opportunities to 
talk through the favored option rather than, for example, repeatedly 
producing evaluative statements about the positions of the two clients 
or the options open to them.‖175 The authors label this technique 
―selective facilitation‖176 and admonish that it should be ―introduced 
with sufficient clarity for clients to be able to recognize it and choose 
whether to go along with it.‖177 
An additional layer should be explored to address concerns of 
partiality in actual mediator behavior: the danger of unconscious bias 
against a party. As previously described, research shows the 
 
 169. Id. at 517. 
 170. Id.  
 171. Id.  
 172. David Greatbatch & Robert Dingwall, Selective Facilitation: Some Preliminary 
Observations on a Strategy Used by Divorce Mediators, 23 LAW & SOC‘Y REV. 613 (1989). 
 173. Id. at 617. 
 174. Id. at 618. Information from the sessions ―demonstrates that the mediator is working 
with notions of what kind of settlement would be desirable (a favored outcome) and what kind 
of settlement would be undesirable (a disfavored outcome), and seeks to guide the interaction 
accordingly.‖ Id.  
 175. Id. at 636. ―More commonly, mediators seem to proceed not by using the negative 
power of a veto but through the positive power of encouraging discussion in specific 
directions.‖ Id. at 617. 
 176. Id. at 618. 
 177. Id. at 639. ―Mediator influence becomes a problem only when formal and substantive 
neutrality are confused so that the pressure becomes invisible or when the choice of goals 
remains a purely personal matter rather than one for which the practitioner may be socially 
accountable.‖ Id. 
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influence of implicit bias on our evaluation of others, judgments, and 
behavior, which is often inconsistent with express statements. ―[E]x 
ante exhortation not to be intentionally unfair will do little to counter 
implicit cognitive processes, which take place outside our awareness 
yet influence our behavior.‖178 In their introductory comments to the 
parties, mediators generally state that they will act in a neutral and 
impartial manner. Ethical and professional standards impose on 
mediators a moral imperative to avoid discrimination in their 
mediations. It is up to the parties to prove discriminatory treatment, 
even though people often do not perceive discrimination. ―A 
behavioral realist analysis has demonstrated that such a model of 
explicit discrimination is not up to the task of responding to implicit 
bias, which is pervasive but diffuse, consequential but unintended, 
ubiquitous but invisible.‖179  
Decades ago, critics cautioned that the mediation process may be 
particularly ill-suited to identify and confront discriminatory 
behavior.
180
 As Richard Delgado and his colleagues warned, ―ADR 
might foster racial or ethnic bias in dispute resolution.‖181 Because 
formal adjudication explicitly manifests ―societal norms of fairness 
and even-handedness‖ through symbols (flag, black robe), ritual, and 
rules, the adversarial process counteracts bias among legal decision 
makers and disputants.
182
 These commentators conclude that 
members of the majority are most likely to show prejudicial behavior 
in informal ADR settings.
183
 They argue that  
ADR is most apt to incorporate prejudice when a person of low 
status and power confronts a person or institution of high status 
and power. In such situations, the party of high status is more 
likely than in other situations to attempt to call up prejudiced 
responses; at the same time, the individual of low status is less 
 
 178. Kang & Banaji, supra note 140, at 1079.  
 179. Id. at 1079–80 (citing Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of 
Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (2006)) (―Recognition of the pervasiveness of 
implicit bias lends support to a structural approach to antidiscrimination law.‖). 
 180. Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in 
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1359.  
 181. Id. at 1367. 
 182. Id. at 1387–88.  
 183. Id. at 1391. 
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likely to press his or her claim energetically. The dangers 
increase when the mediator or other third party is a member of 
the superior group or class.
184
  
To test the ―informality hypothesis‖ that the effects of gender and 
ethnicity will be greater in mediated rather than adjudicated small 
claims cases, Gary LaFree and Christine Rack examined ethnicity 
and gender among participants and mediators in Bernalillo County, 
New Mexico (―MetroCourt study‖).185 These researchers compared 
the impact of disputants‘ ethnicity and gender on monetary outcomes 
in 312 adjudicated and 154 mediated civil cases.
186
 They found 
support for the informality hypothesis (i.e., disparities between Anglo 
males and others will be particularly significant in mediation) in 
contrasts between minority and Anglo claimants.
187
 ―The strongest 
support for the informality hypothesis is for minority male claimants, 
who received significantly lower MORs [monetary outcome ratios] in 
mediation, even when case variables are controlled for.‖188 The study 
found no evidence that minorities or women were ―especially 
disadvantaged as respondents in mediation.‖189 The researchers 
concluded there was some support for an informality hypothesis, i.e., 
―that ethnic and gender disparities are greater in mediation than in 
adjudication.‖190  
LaFree and Rack also sought to test the ―disparity hypothesis‖ that 
minority and female disputants will achieve less favorable outcomes 
than majority and male parties whether their cases are adjudicated or 
mediated, and they found ―considerable support‖ for it.191 Data for 
mediated outcomes showed that minority men and women received 
significantly lower MORs as claimants, and minority men paid 
 
 184. Id. at 1402–03. For a response to Delgado‘s criticisms, see Sara Kristine Trenary, 
Rethinking Neutrality: Race and ADR, 54 DISP. RESOL. J. 40, 44 (1999).  
 185. See generally Gary LaFree & Christine Rack, The Effects of Participants‟ Ethnicity 
and Gender on Monetary Outcomes in Mediated and Adjudicated Civil Cases, 30 LAW & 
SOC‘Y REV. 767 (1996).  
 186. Id. at 771. 
 187. Id. at 778. 
 188. Id. at 780. 
 189. Id. at 778. 
 190. Id. at 789. 
 191. Id. at 788. 
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significantly more as respondents.
192
 The study‘s overall results 
showed 
the strongest evidence of ethnic and gender disparity in the 
treatment of minority claimants in mediation. In the analysis 
including product terms, both minority male and female 
claimants received significantly lower MORs – even when we 
included the nine case-specific and repeat-player variables. Of 
greatest concern is the fact that this disparity was only present 
in cases mediated by at least one Anglo mediator. Cases 
mediated by two minorities resulted in lower MORs, 
regardless of claimant ethnicity.
193
  
Rack conducted a second MetroCourt study involving a full data 
set of 603 small claims cases, of which 323 were adjudicated and 280 
were mediated.
194
 The study looked at a subset of 138 mediated cases 
which resulted in monetary agreements.
195
 Rack compared party 
negotiations before the mediation with negotiation movement during 
the session to assess how the mediation process itself affected 
disputants.
196
 She organized data to view cases as status relationships 
between claimants and the respondents, using five status dimensions: 
race-ethnicity, gender, socio-economic, corporate, and legal 
representation.
197
 She found that ethnic minority claimants settled for 
less than Anglo claimants in mediation.
198
 Compared to Anglo 
counterparts, minority respondents admitted higher liability at the 
outset and reported similar pre-mediation concessions; however, 
during the mediation sessions minority respondents conceded 
proportionally more than Anglo respondents to Anglo claimants.
199
 
 
 192. Id. at 780. 
 193. Id. at 789. 
 194. Christine Rack, Negotiated Justice: Gender & Ethnic Minority Bargaining Patterns in 
the MetroCourt Study, 20 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL‘Y 211, 212 (1999).  
 195. Id.  
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. at 217. In the total sample, those coded as ―minority claimants‖ were: 182 
Hispanics (30.4%), 11 African-Americans (1.8%), 4 Asians (0.7%), 7 Native Americans 
(1.2%), and 5 ―others‖ (0.8%). Those coded as minority respondents were: 216 Hispanics 
(36.1%), 22 African-Americans (3.7%), 11 Asians (1.8%), 5 Native Americans (0.8%), and 14 
―others‖ (2.3%). Id. at 238. 
 199. Id. at 249. 
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―In sum, patterns shown here reflected firm bargaining by higher 
structural status claimants (high initial demands, concession 
resistance, undermatching, and little end stage concession-making). 
At the opposite pole, minority claimants were the softest 
bargainers.‖200 Interestingly, ―claimant ethnicity was the significant 
factor differentiating respondent concession-making; Anglos and men 
were more willing to pay Anglo than minority claimants.‖201 
According to Rack, the study showed that ―Anglos and women [are] 
more likely to show insider bias.‖202  
Mediators in Rack‘s study exhibited ―Anglo-protective bias.‖203 
―Especially when the respondent was Anglo, mediators‘ status 
deference and ethic of ‗neutrality‘ became a means through which the 
mediation environment served to support exploitation of soft 
bargaining.‖204 Rack observed that ―[o]vert prejudice was rarely 
acknowledged by disputants or recognized by mediators although the 
effects were apparent in the outcomes.‖205 Noting that ―[n]on-
dominant groups may hold different fairness values, hold unequal 
power in negotiations with more dominant parties, and accept 
disadvantaged outcomes,‖ Rack concluded that ―those who are 
traditionally perceived as less competent continue to be perceived 
that way persistently so that hierarchies are recreated through a 
process of self-fulfilling prophecy. Attempts to break free of others‘ 
expectations are often negatively misperceived and actively 
discouraged until less privileged actors retreat from trying.‖206  
Rack‘s MetroCourt study raises concerns that ―insider bias‖ and 
―Anglo-protective‖ behavior on the part of mediators, along with 
settlement pressure to avoid perceived risks of adjudication, put 
minority parties at a significant disadvantage. Her case studies 
―suggest what appeared to be primary mediator patterns in these 
cases; Anglo mediators leaned on external status characteristics to 
 
 200. Id. at 253. 
 201. Id. at 258. 
 202. Id. at 289.  
 203. Id. at 273. 
 204. Id. at 262. 
 205. Id. at 276. 
 206. Id. at 230–31 (citing Cecilia L. Ridgeway, Interaction and the Conservation of 
Gender Inequality: Considering Employment, 62 AM. SOC. REV. 218, 218–35 (1997)). 
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grant legitimacy in the absence of cultural understanding, a pattern 
that apparently reinforced a pattern of hierarchy acceptance within 
the minority culture.‖207 Rack noted, ―The interest-based negotiation 
process and the mediators‘ often unexamined and unintended 
influence (or lack thereof), offered various opportunities for betrayals 
of justice. . . . Minority disputants, not Anglo women, manifested 
bargaining patterns that implied socialization patterns that could be 
and were substantively exploited by more dominant parties.‖208 Rack 
concluded that ―data suggested that the most imbalanced outcomes 
resulted from settlement pressure through constructing non-monetary 
substitutes for monetary claims, and by invoking, perhaps 
misrepresenting, evidentiary rules to discourage disputants from 
adjudication.‖209 
Unique conditions of the mediation process may contribute to 
discriminatory mediator action (or inaction) in another way. In Race 
as Proxy: Situational Racism and Self-Fulfilling Stereotypes, Lu-in 
Wang examines the influence of situational context on discriminatory 
behavior in social interactions.
210
 Wang argues that race functions as 
a proxy for negative characteristics associated with skin color, such 
as ―laziness, incompetence, and hostility . . . lack of patriotism or 
disloyalty to the United States . . . susceptibility to some diseases . . . 
[and] criminality and deviance.‖211 Wang contends that ―fewer 
individuals than in the past are likely to be motivated by 
discriminatory animus. . . . Most of us are afflicted instead with 
unconscious cognitive and motivational biases that lead us to 
reflexively categorize, perceive, interpret the behavior of, remember, 
and interact with people of different races differently.‖212  
 
 207. Id. at 263. The minorities involved were Latinos. Rack expressly stated that the same 
patterns may not be found in research with other minority groups. Id. 
 208. Id. at 294–95. ―Disparate outcomes were created by apparently soft bargaining that 
was leveraged by mediators and exploited by opportunistic respondents into greater 
concessions. Minority claimants were vulnerable to suggestions that they could not expect 
much from their judicial alternative.‖ Id. at 286. 
 209. Id. at 296. 
 210. Lu-in Wang, Race as Proxy: Situational Racism and Self-Fulfilling Stereotypes, 53 
DEPAUL L. REV. 1013 (2004).  
 211. Id. at 1013–14. Proxy captures the unconscious and habitual ―‗default‘ manner in 
which race often influences decision-making.‖ Id. at 1015. 
 212. Id. at 1017. 
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Wang advocates an examination of ―social constraints‖ as 
powerful unseen influences on discriminatory behavior.
213
 Contextual 
circumstances and ―external factors‖ work to create ―channel factors‖ 
which direct behavior by (1) determining how an individual defines a 
situation, and (2) channeling her behavior by indicating the 
appropriate conduct for that situation, ―essentially opening or closing 
pathways for action.‖214 Wang cites studies that show that ―situations 
that include clear indications of right and wrong behavior [] tend to 
lessen the likelihood of discrimination.‖215 Normative ambiguity 
tends to promote discrimination and ―the power of ambiguity to 
channel discrimination goes hand-in-hand with its ability to mask 
it.‖216 Normative ambiguity can arise where appropriate behavior in a 
particular context is not clearly identified and where clearly negative 
behavior can be justified on a basis other than race.
217
 Stated another 
way, ―normative clarity discouraged racial bias, but normative 
ambiguity channeled it.‖218  
Could normative ambiguity in the mediation process channel 
biased mediator behavior as Wang posits? Mediators lack the surety 
of clearly defined rules of intervention. Among mediation 
professionals, there is little normative consensus regarding 
appropriate actions and behavior. The mediator‘s judgments about 
the parties, her decision to intervene or remain passive at any given 
time, and her use of various techniques to encourage agreement may 
be rationalized as ―neutral,‖ thus masking bias. An individual ―is 
likely to discriminate in ambiguous situations despite her egalitarian 
values and lack of prejudice, because she may not be aware of the 
need to monitor her response and because racial stereotypes are 
 
 213. Id. at 1025. 
 214. Id. at 1026 (citing LEE ROSS & RICHARD E. NISBETT, THE PERSON AND THE 
SITUATION: PERSPECTIVES OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 10 (1991)). 
 215. Id. at 1038. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. at 1038–39. Citing juror studies, Wang notes that subjects were more likely to 
engage in discriminatory behavior when they could point to a non-discriminatory reason to 
rationalize their actions. For example, subjects might rationalize that verdicts were motivated 
by a desire to not let a guilty person go free rather than by racial bias. Id. at 1043. 
 218. Id. at 1039. 
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always accessible and automatically activated, and will lead her to 
discriminate despite her best intentions.‖219  
Against this backdrop of implicit bias research and the operation 
of mediator partiality in actual practice, the next Part returns to the 
case scenario as a vehicle to contemplate subtle dynamics that might 
operate within a discrete mediation context.  
IV. APPLICATION TO ASIAN AMERICANS
220
 IN MEDIATION 
Turning back to the Michigan small claims mediation described in 
the Introduction, I hope to stimulate a fresh inquiry into mediator 
actions. What influence, if any, might implicit bias have had on the 
mediators‘ perception and judgment of the parties? Is it possible that 
the mediators unintentionally favored the business owner in the 
mediation? As in the MetroCourt study, did the mediators 
demonstrate ―insider bias‖ or in-group protectionism? Could the 
mediators‘ attitudes toward the homeowners have been colored by 
Asian stereotypes? In what ways could unconsciously held 
stereotypic views of a group operate in a seemingly simple non-
racialized dispute? ―[S]tereotypes about ethnic groups appear as part 
of the social heritage of society. They are transmitted across 
generations as a component of the accumulated knowledge of a 
society. They are as true as tradition, and as pervasive as folklore. No 
person can grow up in a society without having learned the 
stereotypes assigned to the major ethnic groups.‖221 At the outset, let 
me state that I believe the mediators conducted the process earnestly 
and without indication of explicit negative or positive attitudes 
toward either party. They showed no outright bias, favoritism, or 
prejudice during the mediation. They employed a facilitative style of 
 
 219. Id. at 1045 (citing Patricia G. Devine, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Their Automatic and 
Controlled Components, 56 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5, 15–16 (1989)). 
 220. The United States Census Bureau defines Asian-American as ―[a] person having 
origins in any of the original peoples of the Far East, Southeast Asia, or the Indian subcontinent 
including, for example, Cambodia, China, India, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, the 
Philippine Islands, Thailand, and Vietnam. It includes ‗Asian Indian,‘ ‗Chinese,‘ ‗Filipino,‘ 
‗Korean,‘ ‗Japanese,‘ ‗Vietnamese,‘ and ‗Other Asian.‘‖ U.S. Census Bureau, State & County 
QuickFacts, CENSUS.GOV, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/meta/long_RHI425200.htm (last 
visited Nov. 30, 2010). 
 221. HOWARD J. EHRLICH, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PREJUDICE 35 (1973).  
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mediation as taught in the required forty-hour Michigan Civil 
Mediation Training.
222
 I suggest that the likelihood that implicit bias 
operated is as great as, or even greater than, the likelihood it did not. 
A. Evolution of Asian American Stereotypes 
Asian American stereotypes have notably evolved over the past 
century. Chinese in the United States in the late 1800s were 
characterized as opium-smoking, morally deficient sub-humans.
223
 
Fearing the ―yellow peril‖ at the turn of the nineteenth century, 
Americans portrayed Chinese as military, cultural, or economic 
enemies and unfair competitors.
224
 Courts and legislatures have a 
long history of discrimination against Asian Americans.
225
 In People 
v. Hall,
226
 Chinese were described as people  
whose mendacity is proverbial; a race of people whom nature 
has marked as inferior, and who are incapable of progress or 
intellectual development beyond a certain point, as their 
history has shown; differing in language, opinions, color, and 
 
 222. This assumes the training they underwent was similar to the one I completed in order 
to mediate small claims cases. 
 223. Neil Gotanda, Asian American Rights and the “Miss Saigon Syndrome,” in ASIAN 
AMERICANS AND THE SUPREME COURT: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1087 (Hyung-Chan Kim 
ed., 1992); RONALD T. TAKAKI, STRANGERS FROM A DIFFERENT SHORE: A HISTORY OF ASIAN 
AMERICANS 99–112 (rev. ed. 1998); Keith Aoki, “Foreign-ness” & Asian American Identities: 
Yellowface, World War II Propaganda, and Bifurcated Racial Stereotypes, 4 ASIAN PAC. AM. 
L.J. 1, 18–23 (1996); Pat K. Chew, Asian Americans: The “Reticent” Minority and Their 
Paradoxes, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 12–15 (1994). 
 224. TAKAKI, supra note 223, at 81; see also Natsu Taylor Saito, Model Minority, Yellow 
Peril: Functions of “Foreignness” in the Construction of Asian American Legal Identity, 4 
ASIAN L.J. 71, 72 (1997). 
 225. For example, the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58, barred Chinese 
immigration and ―caused untold suffering and hardship, separating families, creating a society 
of single men, and institutionalizing hostility, prejudice against and isolation of Chinese 
immigrants and Chinese Americans.‖ City & Cnty. of S.F. Bd. Res. 363–09 (San Francisco, 
Cal. Sept. 15, 2009). Resolution No. 363-09 of the San Francisco Board of Supervisors 
―acknowledg[es] the regrettable role that San Francisco has played in advancing the policies of 
the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, the first federal law to discriminate against a specific group 
solely on the basis of race or nationality.‖ Id. 
 226. 4 Cal. 399 (1854). 
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physical conformation; between whom and ourselves nature 
has placed an impassable difference.
227
 
The Supreme Court upheld the denial of citizenship to Japanese 
and Hindus from India, concluding that the forefathers intended to 
exclude ―Asiatics‖ from naturalization and citizenship.228 ―Alien 
Land Laws‖ denied Americans of Japanese ancestry the right to own 
property.
229
 Fervent anti-Japanese sentiment and suspicion ultimately 
led to the incarceration of 120,000 Japanese American citizens and 
legal permanent residents during World War II.
230
  
The next forty years witnessed a shift in the way Asian Americans 
were perceived. As time passed, Asian Americans went from being a 
―bad‖ minority to a ―good‖ minority. They were viewed as smart, 
industrious, and unassuming.
231
 William Peterson first coined the 
term ―model minority‖ in a 1966 New York Times Magazine article 
about Japanese Americans.
232
 Asian Americans were held up as 
examples of minority success through hard work, sacrifice, following 
rules, keeping their noses to the grindstone, and minding their own 
business. Asian Americans, in short, achieved the American Dream. 
Americans have embraced the model minority perception as the 
contemporary Asian American stereotype.
233
 
 
 227. Id. at 405. The court found that section 13 of the Act of April 16, 1850, prohibited 
Chinese people from testifying in favor of or against white men. Id. The court thus reversed the 
conviction of a white man who was found guilty of murder based on the testimony of Chinese 
witnesses. Id. 
 228. Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 195–96 (1922). In Ozawa, the Court found that 
section 2169 of the Revised Statutes, which limited naturalization to aliens who were ―free 
white persons‖ and to aliens of African descent, applied to the Naturalization Act of June 29, 
1906, ch. 3592, secs. 355–353, § 1, 34 Stat. 596 (1906). Ozawa, 260 U.S. at 194. This made the 
Japanese appellant ineligible for naturalization because he was not a free white person. Id. at 
198; see also United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204 (1923) (determining that the term ―free 
white persons‖ was to be interpreted as a common man would understand it; that the term was 
found to be synonymous with the word ―Caucasian‖; and that a high caste Hindu of full Indian 
blood was not included in that term). 
 229. Keith Aoki, No Right to Own?: The Early Twentieth-Century “Alien Land Laws” as a 
Prelude to Internment, 40 B.C. L. REV. 37, 38 (l998). 
 230. ERIC K. YAMAMOTO ET AL., RACE, RIGHTS AND REPARATION: LAW AND THE 
JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT 4 (2001). 
 231. Saito, supra note 224, at 71. 
 232. Chew, supra note 223, at 24 (citing William Petersen, Success Story, Japanese-
American Style, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan. 9, 1966, at 20–21, 33, 36, 40–41, 43). 
 233. Id. at 24. 
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The model minority stereotype, like all stereotypes, is inaccurate. 
Lumping all Americans of Asian descent into one homogeneous 
category ignores vast differences among the many ethnicities. Dozens 
of different ethnic groups fall under the ―Asian American‖ 
umbrella.
234
 In fact, the pan-Asian identity reflected in the term did 
not develop until the 1960s.
235
 Three main factors complicate any 
assumption of Asian Americans as a monolithic group: country of 
ancestry, length of residence in the United States, and gender.
236
  
The model minority myth also has a negative side. Quiet, high 
achieving, workaholic go-getters may also be seen as cut-throat, 
inscrutable, and sneaky.
237
 Asian Americans are viewed as skilled in 
scientific, technical, and quantitative fields, but lacking in verbal, 
social, and interpersonal skills.
238
 This positive/negative duality of the 
stereotype is ―akin to the paradoxical topology of a mobieus strip. If 
pressed, the so-called ‗good‘ attributes . . . easily transform into the 
‗bad‘ attributes . . . and vice versa.‖239 
The model minority myth masks challenges faced by Asian 
Americans who are over-credited with ascension on the ladder of 
success. The poverty rate for Asian Americans is almost twice that of 
white Americans.
240
 Family income comparisons fail to recognize 
that Asian families typically have more workers per family than 
families with higher individual incomes.
241
 Perceptions of Asian 
 
 234. Id. at 25. 
 235. YAMAMOTO ET AL., supra note 230, at 269–70. 
 236. Chew, supra note 223, at 26. For example, a fourth-generation Japanese American in 
California has very little in common with a recent Hmong immigrant in Minnesota, and Native 
Hawaiians have a vastly different set of experiences and perspectives than mainland Asian 
Americans. 
 237. Saito, supra note 224, at 72; Chew, supra note 223, at 38. 
 238. The ―Asians are good at math‖ stereotype is so strong that it is even internalized by 
Asian Americans. The Math Test study by Margaret Shih showed that by unconsciously 
activating a particular identity (Asian) in Asian American female undergraduates, performance 
on a difficult math test was improved. Conversely, when female identity was unconsciously 
activated, the students‘ performance was depressed downward. Margaret Shih et al., Stereotype 
Susceptibility: Identity Salience and Shifts in Quantitative Performance, 10 PSYCHOL. SCI. 80 
(1999). 
 239. Aoki, supra note 223, at 35–36. 
 240. Saito, supra note 224, at 90 (citing William R. Tamayo, When the “Coloreds” Are 
Neither Black Nor Citizens: The United States Civil Rights Movement and Global Migration, 2 
ASIAN L.J. 1, 15 n.97 (1995)). 
 241. TAKAKI, supra note 223, at 475. 
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Americans include the belief that they are not the targets of racial 
discrimination
242
 and that they are represented throughout the ranks 
of industries and professions.
243
 Discussing Asian Americans, one 
scholar commented that ―[a]lthough they are often needy and 
disadvantaged, they are not perceived as facing any obvious barriers 
greater than those of previous immigrant groups. . . . For example, 
there is less concern about [them] than about blacks, and they are less 
negatively stereotyped.‖244 The model minority myth sends a 
message that Asian American claims of discrimination are not to be 
taken seriously.
245
  
The stereotype that Asian Americans are deferential and 
unassertive hurts their potential to advance in various professional 
fields. Asian Americans are under-represented at the top levels of 
corporate, legal, and commercial management.
246
 ―[B]eliefs about 
Asian Americans as individually passive, obedient, hardworking, and 
socially inept encourage employers to hire them, but not promote 
them to upper levels of management. The combined effect of these 
racial beliefs produces a glass ceiling.‖247 Stereotyping of this nature 
is evident in a recent case involving the exclusion of Asian 
Americans as grand jury forepersons.
248
 In Chin v. Runnels, a 
 
 242. Gotanda, supra note 223, at 1091. One study found that nearly 40 percent of whites 
thought that with regard to job and housing discrimination, Asian Americans experience ―little‖ 
or ―none.‖ Chew, supra note 223, at 8 (citing Michael McQueen, Voters‟ Responses to Poll 
Discloses Huge Chasm Between Social Attitudes of Blacks and Whites, WALL ST. J., May 17, 
1991, at A16). In contrast, another study indicated that 49 percent of Asian Americans stated 
they had experienced discrimination. Id. at 8 (citing Study Says Asians Feel Bias More Than 
Hispanics, L.A. DAILY J., Dec. 12, 1985, at 1). 
 243. Chew, supra note 223, at 46. 
 244. David O. Sears, Racism and Politics in the United States, in CONFRONTING RACISM: 
THE PROBLEM AND THE RESPONSE 76, 95 (Jennifer L. Eberhardt & Susan T. Fiske eds., 1998).  
 245. Gotanda, supra note 223, at 1089. 
 246. Chew, supra note 223, at 47–49. 
 247. Don Operario & Susan T. Fiske, Racism Equals Power Plus Prejudice: A Social 
Psychological Equation for Racial Oppression, in CONFRONTING RACISM: THE PROBLEM AND 
THE RESPONSE 33, 52 (Jennifer L. Eberhardt & Susan T. Fiske eds., 1998). 
 248. See Darren Seiji Teshima, A “Hardy Handshake Sort of Guy”: The Model Minority 
and Implicit Bias About Asian Americans in Chin v. Runnels, 11 ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 122 
(2006) (arguing that court officials, implicitly biased because of the model minority stereotype, 
believed that Asian Americans were not good forepersons because they were not good leaders); 
see also Benson, supra note 135, at 47 (hypothesizing that a judge who accepted prejudiced 
stereotypes of Asian Americans as ―introverted and timid‖ would not select a Chinese 
American foreperson). 
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Chinese-American defendant claimed that exclusion of Chinese-
Americans, Hispanic-Americans, and Filipino-Americans as grand 
jury forepersons violated his right to equal protection under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.
249
 Petitioner established a prima facie case 
of discrimination in the selection of jury forepersons under a process 
in which the judge and others identified ―leadership capabilities.‖250 
The court expressly entertained the claim that unconscious biases 
may have contributed to this forty year exclusion, concluding that 
there may be ―a sizeable risk that perceptions and decisions made 
here may have been affected by unconscious bias.‖251  
The second pervasive stereotype of Asian Americans is known as 
the ―perpetual foreigner syndrome.‖252 This element of ―foreignness‖ 
is rooted in the racial categorization of Asians as the ―Mongolian or 
yellow race,‖ as distinguished from the ―white or Caucasian race.‖253 
Even Asian Americans who are native-born citizens have historically 
been viewed as foreigners.
254
 Foreignness became linked with 
political disloyalty.
255
 The imprisonment of Japanese Americans, 
many of whom were U.S. citizens, during World War II presents a 
glaring example of this conflation of native-born Asian American 
citizens with a foreign enemy.
256
 Similarly, the foreignness-disloyalty 
connection has been applied to Korean Americans and Vietnamese 
Americans during conflicts with Asian countries.
257
 The imagery of 
 
 249. Chin v. Runnels, 343 F. Supp. 2d 891, 892 (N.D. Cal. 2004). 
 250. Id. at 896–97, 901. Statistical evidence showed that between 1960 and 1996, not one 
Chinese American, Filipino American, or Hispanic American served as jury foreperson, and 
that the statistical likelihood of this occurring was 0.0003%. Id. at 895. 
 251. Id. at 908. The court denied petitioner‘s habeas claim but intimated that under de novo 
review, petitioner likely would have been granted relief. Id. at 905–08. 
 252. FRANK H. WU, YELLOW: RACE IN AMERICA BEYOND BLACK AND WHITE 79–129 
(2002); Saito, supra note 224, at 76; Gotanda, supra note 223, at 1097; Chew, supra note 223, 
at 34. 
 253. See Saito, supra note 224, at 78 (citing In re Ah Yup, 1 F. Cas. 223 (D. Cal. 1878)); 
see also Aoki, supra note 223, at 9–10. 
 254. Saito, supra note 224, at 75–76; see also Chew, supra note 223, at 35. 
 255. Saito, supra note 224, at 82. 
 256. YAMAMOTO, supra note 230, at 4; Saito, supra note 224, at 81–83. General John L. 
DeWitt, leader of the Western Defense Command who favored internment of West Coast 
Japanese Americans, famously said, ―A Jap‘s a Jap. . . . It makes no difference whether he is an 
American citizen, [theoretically,] he is still a Japanese.‖ YAMAMOTO ET AL., supra note 230, at 
99. 
 257. Saito, supra note 224, at 84. 
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Asian Americans as the enemy persists through economic 
competition and American trade protectionism, from the 1980s 
―Japan bashing‖ caused by automotive competition to imposition of 
tariffs on cheaper tires imported from China in 2009.
258
 
Social cognition research by Thierry Devos and Mahzarin Banaji 
in 2005 substantiated the perpetual foreigner syndrome. Their study 
revealed that Asian Americans are perceived as being less American 
than both Whites and African Americans.
259
 Experimental subjects 
linked American-ness more with white Europeans (e.g., Hugh Grant) 
than with famous Asian Americans (e.g., Connie Chung).
260
 ―The 
conclusion that can be drawn on the basis of the six studies presented 
here is unambiguous. To be American is to be White.‖261 The model 
minority myth and perpetual foreigner syndrome were confirmed by 
scientific method in 2009. A survey conducted by Harris Interactive 
in January 2009 using a computer-assisted telephone interviewing 
system (―C100 Survey‖) assessed current attitudes toward Chinese 
 
 258. WU, supra note 252, at 70, 88–89; Peter Whoriskey & Anne Kornblut, U.S. to Impose 
Tariff on Tires From China, WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 2009, at A1. 
 259. Thierry Devos & Mahzarin R. Banaji, American = White?, 88 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 447, 463 (2005). Readers may recall MSNBC‘s gaffe in 1998, running the headline 
―American Beats Out Kwan‖ on a story about Tara Lipinski‘s defeat of her favored U.S. 
teammate, Michelle Kwan. See Steve Mirsky, Birth of a Notion: Implicit Social Cognition and 
the „Birther‟ Movement, SCI. AM., Oct. 2009, at 100. 
 260. Devos & Banaji, supra note 259, at 456–57. 
 261. Id. at 463. Devos conducted a more recent study that found that the participants more 
closely associated Hillary Clinton with American sentiments than they did Barack Obama. This 
was true regardless of whether race, gender, or personal identity were emphasized, though it 
was more pronounced when race was emphasized. Thierry Devos, Debbie S. Ma & Travis 
Gaffud, Is Barack Obama American Enough to Be the Next President?: The Role of Ethnicity 
and National Identity in American Politics, http://www.rohan.sdsu.edu/~tdevos/thd/Devos_ 
spsp2008.pdf. The researchers concluded, ―A Black candidate is implicitly conceived of as 
being less American than a White candidate when perceivers focus on the targets‘ ethnicity.‖ 
Id.; see also Gregory S. Parks, Jeffrey J. Rachlinksi & Richard A. Epstein, Debate: Implicit 
Bias and the 2008 Presidential Election: Much Ado about Nothing?, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 
PENNUMBRA 210 (2009), available at http://www.pennumbra.com/debates/pdfs/Implicit 
Bias.pdf. Parks, Rachlinski, and Epstein argue that while Obama‘s election represents a 
monumental stride forward for race relations, any announcement of a post-racial America is 
premature because of the race-tinged aspects of the election, including perceptions of Obama as 
insufficiently patriotic or American. Citing implicit bias, they caution that ―[m]odern racism no 
longer produces an overt smoking gun marking its influence; one has to look fairly carefully to 
find its influence. It operates not as an absolute barrier, but as a kind of tax on members of 
racial minorities. It facilitates certain negative assumptions through an invisible influence.‖ Id. 
at 214. 
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and Asian Americans.
262
 The survey covered issues such as ―race 
relations, social equality, immigration, and factors influencing public 
attitudes.‖263 It compared responses from the general population 
sample and responses from the Chinese American sample. Related to 
the model minority myth, ―[o]ver half of both the general population 
and Chinese Americans believe Asian Americans achieve a higher 
degree of overall success often or always in comparison to other 
Americans.‖264 Reflecting perpetual foreigner status, 74 percent of 
the general population sample overestimated the proportion of the 
U.S. population that is made up of Asian Americans; 
contemporaneously, 51 percent underestimated the population of 
Asians born in the United States.
265
 Judging loyalty, three-quarters of 
the Chinese American over-sample said that Chinese Americans 
―would support the U.S. in military or economic conflicts between 
the U.S. and China,‖ but only about half of the general population 
―believe Chinese Americans would support the U.S. in such 
conflicts.‖266 On racial profiling, only two-fifths of the general 
population think the FBI might prematurely arrest an Asian 
American;
267
 more than half of the Chinese American respondents 
believe the FBI would arrest an Asian American without sufficient 
evidence.
268
  
 
 262. COMMITTEE OF 100 & HARRIS INTERACTIVE, STILL THE ―OTHER?‖: PUBLIC 
ATTITUDES TOWARD CHINESE AND ASIAN AMERICANS (2009), available at http://www.survey. 
committee100.org/2009/files/FullReportfinal.pdf. The survey followed up on a 2001 study ―to 
gauge shifts in attitudes‖ and to ―explore factors that help formulate perceptions and the 
reasoning behind attitude changes.‖ Id. at 8. The survey used ―split samples to compare 
attitudes toward Chinese Americans, Asian Americans, and other racial or religious groups. In 
addition to the general population sample, an over-sample of Chinese Americans was 
conducted.‖ Id.  
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. at 42. 
 265. Id. at 40. 
 266. Id. at 43. 
 267. Id. at 45. 
 268. Id. at 44. For a discussion of the Wen Ho Lee case as a recent example of Asian 
American racial profiling, see Neil Gotanda, Comparative Racialization: Racial Profiling and 
the Case of Wen Ho Lee, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1689, 1692–94 (2000). 
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B. Revisiting the Small Claims Case 
Returning to the small claims mediation, let us reexamine the 
mediators‘ conclusion that the door was closed. Presumably, the 
mediator team was aware of the importance of mediator neutrality to 
their role and to the sustention of a legitimate process.
269
 The 
Michigan Standards of Conduct for Mediators require the mediators 
to ―remain impartial.‖270 Studies find that implicit bias is so 
pervasive, it is likely most of us are affected.
271
 Also, IAT data show 
unconscious racial bias among European American test takers toward 
disadvantaged groups.
272
 Dissociation between implicit and explicit 
attitudes is common, so these mediators may hold explicit anti-
discrimination attitudes and espouse egalitarian views but still have 
implicit racial biases.
273
  
At a very early age, young Americans learn the stereotypes 
associated with the various major social groups. These 
stereotypes generally have a long history of repeated 
activation, and are apt to be highly accessible, whether or not 
they are believed. . . . [O]ne can be ―nonprejudiced‖ as a 
matter of conscious belief and yet remain vulnerable to the 
subtle cognitive and behavioral effects of implicit 
stereotypes.
274
 
Also, implicit attitudes are better predictors of some behaviors than 
explicit attitudes.
275
 It is conceivable that the mediators interacted 
 
 269. With regard to impartiality, the Standards of Conduct for Mediators put forward by 
the State Court Administrative Office of the Michigan Supreme Court state:  
A mediator shall conduct the mediation in an impartial manner. The concept of 
mediator impartiality is central to the mediation process. A mediator shall mediate 
only those matters in which it is possible to remain impartial and even-handed. If at 
any time the mediator is unable to conduct the process in an impartial manner, the 
mediator is obligated to withdraw.  
STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS (State Court Admin. Office, Mich. Supreme Court 
2001), available at http://www.courts.michigan.gov/scao/resources/standards/ odr/conduct.pdf.  
 270. Id. 
 271. Lane, Kang & Banaji, supra note 71, at 433–37. 
 272. Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 66, at 955–58. 
 273. Id. at 955–56. 
 274. Krieger & Fiske, supra note 133, at 1033. 
 275. Lane, Kang & Banaji, supra note 71, at 435–37. 
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with the parties in a way that was unconsciously more favorable 
toward the business owner and less favorable toward the 
homeowners. We learned that group membership implicitly affects a 
person‘s identity formation and unconscious expressions of feeling 
and thought, and that in-group favoritism is strong.
276
 ―A person may 
have a view of herself as egalitarian but find herself unable to control 
prejudicial thoughts about members of a group, perhaps including 
groups of which she is a member.‖277 A person‘s membership in a 
group implicitly affects that person‘s identity formation and ―ingroup 
bias occurs automatically or unconsciously under minimal 
conditions.‖278  
Considering potential mediator bias and favoritism in light of the 
science of implicit social cognition, it is conceivable that Asian 
American stereotypes were automatically activated when the 
mediators met the homeowners. ―[M]erely encountering a member of 
a stereotyped group primes the trait constructs associated with and, in 
a sense, constituting, the stereotype. Once activated, these constructs 
can function as implicit expectancies, spontaneously shaping the 
perceiver‘s perception, characterization, memory, and judgment of 
the stereotyped target.‖279 Clearly, race alters interpersonal, 
intrapersonal, and intergroup interactions.
280
  
With activation of the stereotype that Asians are untrustworthy, 
the mediators may have unconsciously viewed the homeowners as 
less credible or as giving a less reliable account of the rug cleaning 
situation. They may have implicitly favored the story put forward by 
the carpet cleaner (in-group) and discredited the version offered by 
the homeowners (devalued out-group). Perceiving the homeowners as 
 
 276. Thierry Devos & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Self and Identity, in HANDBOOK OF 
SELF AND IDENTITY 153, 154–58 (M.R. Leary & J.P. Tangney eds., 2003), reprinted in 1001 
ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 177, 179–85 (2003). 
 277. Id. at 179. 
 278. Id. at 185. 
 279. Krieger & Fiske, supra note 133, at 1033. 
 280. Kang, supra note 136, at 1493; see also Kang & Banaji, supra note 140, at 1085 (―An 
individual (target) is mapped into a social category in accordance with prevailing legal and 
cultural mapping rules. Once mapped, the category activates various meanings, which include 
cognitive and affective associations that may be partly hard-wired but are mostly culturally-
conditioned. These activated meanings then alter interaction between perceiver and target. 
These [racial] mechanics occur automatically, without effort or conscious awareness on the part 
of the perceiver.‖). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol34/iss1/4
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2010]  Implicit Bias and the Illusion of Mediator Neutrality 119 
 
 
foreign may have activated mental links associating them as an 
―enemy.‖ The mediators may have unconsciously judged the 
homeowners as less deserving of relief because of the model minority 
myth and their ―success‖ in relation to the carpet cleaner.  
Mediator memory may have played a role here. Experiments 
reveal a causal relationship between unconscious stereotypes and 
biases in perception and memory.
281
 Memory errors may occur 
―because of the human mind‘s heavy reliance on stereotypes during 
the encoding and recall of information.‖282 Justin Levinson conducted 
a study testing the effect of implicit racial bias on juror memory.
283
 
After reading a story about an incident (a fight or employment 
termination) and performing a distraction task, 153 students of 
diverse backgrounds
284
 answered a questionnaire about the story. The 
race of the actors in the story was a variable 
(black/white/Hawaiian).
285
 Overall, participants misremembered 
information in a racially biased way against blacks, less so for 
Hawaiians.
286
 Participants recalled aggressiveness of blacks more 
easily and generated false memories of their aggression, whereas 
false memory toward the white actor was positive (receiving an 
award).
287
 Recall is more accurate and false memory generation 
occurs more with stereotype-consistent information.
288
 In addition, 
―cognitive confirmation effect‖ has been verified experimentally.289 
Once a social schema (e.g., race, gender) has been activated, a person 
will often actively search for information that supports that schema 
 
 281. See Banaji & Greenwald, supra note 94. 
 282. Justin D. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Decisionmaking, and 
Misremembering, 57 DUKE L.J. 345, 376 (2007). 
 283. Id. at 345. 
 284. Id. at 390–91. The study consisted of 71.2 percent women. Approximately 20 percent 
of the participants were Japanese American, 20 percent were white, 50 percent were of mixed 
ethnicity, 2 percent were Hawaiian, 4 percent identified as Other, and there were no African 
Americans. Id. 
 285. Id. at 394. 
 286. Id. at 398. 
 287. Id. at 398–99. 
 288. Id. at 400–01. 
 289. Page, supra note 149, at 216–17 (citing John M. Darley & Paget H. Gross, A 
Hypothesis-Confirming Bias in Labeling Effects, 44 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 20, 20 
(1983)). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
120 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 34:71 
 
 
rather than information that is inconsistent, a process that occurs 
unconsciously.
290
  
Discrimination on the basis of the Asian homeowners‘ accent is 
another possible influence on the mediators. Mari Matsuda cautions 
that ―discrimination against accent is the functional equivalent of 
discrimination against foreign origin.‖291 Accent discrimination is 
triggered by ―the collective xenophobic unconscious‖ bias that 
operates when a different voice is devalued.
292
 A prejudiced listener 
will attach ―a cultural meaning, typically a racist cultural meaning, to 
the accent.‖293 Matsuda suggests that awareness that accent 
discrimination is a potential problem can help listeners avoid 
unconscious negative reaction to the accents.
294
 Interestingly, not all 
accents evoke negative reactions. Writing about university tenure 
decisions, an academic observed that accent is usually a factor in 
tenure decisions when the professor is a member of an Asian, Indian, 
African, or Middle Eastern culture; it rarely arises in the case of 
native speakers of European languages.
295
 In the Michigan case, the 
homeowners‘ accents, coupled with negative Asian stereotypes, may 
have caused the mediators to devalue their statements which 
contradicted the carpet cleaner. 
 
 290. Id. 
 291. Mari J. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, Antidiscrimination Law, and a 
Jurisprudence for the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329, 1349 (1991). Observing that 
speech can position people socially, Matsuda claims that ―certain dialects and accents are 
associated with wealth and power. Others are low-status with negative associations.‖ Id. at 1352 
(citing Marc Fisher, At GWU, Accent is on English for Foreign Instructors: Student Complaints 
About Teaching Assistants Lead to Testing Program, WASH. POST, Nov. 29, 1986, at B1); see 
also Beatrice Bich-Dao Nguyen, Accent Discrimination and the Test of Spoken English: A Call 
for an Objective Assessment of the Comprehensibility of Nonnative Speakers, 1 ASIAN L.J. 117, 
122 (1994); Kristina D. Curkovic, Accent and the University: Accent as Pretext for National 
Origin Discrimination in Tenure Decisions, 26 J.C. & U.L. 727 (2000); Mary E. Mullin, 
Comment, Title VII: Help or Hindrance to the Accent Plaintiff, 19 W. ST. U. L. REV. 561, 571 
(1992); Brant T. Lee, The Network Economic Effects of Whiteness, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 1259, 
1275 (2004). 
 292. Matsuda, supra note 291, at 1372 (citing ROBERT TAKAKI, FROM DIFFERENT SHORES: 
PERSPECTIVES ON RACE AND ETHNICITY IN AMERICA (1987)) (asserting that accent 
discrimination involves ―a set of ingrained assumptions that are inevitably lodged in the process 
of evaluation and in the ways in which we assign values‖). 
 293. Id. at 1378. 
 294. Id. at 1373. 
 295. Curkovic, supra note 291, at 742–43. 
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The previous sections of this Article are intended to provoke, not 
proselytize. The purpose of presenting the small claims scenario is to 
raise the issue of implicit bias, not to resolve it definitively. As 
instructors and providers of mediation services, we should understand 
that mere good intentions to act impartially are insufficient to counter 
unconscious biases.  
Mediation, despite its image as a neutral procedure in which all 
values are honored equally and all parties are free to express 
their points of view, can often be skewed by bias. Mediators 
often make quick judgments and proffer strong statements 
infused with their biases, which, though not legally binding, 
can powerfully impact the outcome of a settlement. . . . 
Moreover, bias on the part of any mediator can creep into the 
process in even more subtle ways, such as in the subjective 
matters of how questioning occurs and how and whether 
private caucuses are conducted.  
 Compounding the problem, it is nearly impossible to 
accurately observe or address issues of bias in the informal 
consensus-building environment of mediation, especially 
because there is an unspoken taboo against acknowledging 
it.
296
 
IV. WHAT DO WE DO? 
The prospect of mitigating mediator bias is daunting, but myriad 
acts and practices within the control of mediators may help address 
the problem. As a first step, mediation professionals must be realistic 
and frank about the vast range of mediator behavior and the 
maneuvers mediators employ to meet the ethical standard of 
neutrality. We should accept that mediator neutrality is elusive and 
shape-shifting; it is neither a condition nor characteristic that one 
possesses or lacks. It is a complex, multi-layered relationship and a 
system of interaction with the parties that requires constant vigilance. 
A mediator does not enter a mediation as a ―neutral‖ entity, free from 
 
 296. Frederick Hertz, Bias in Mediation and Arbitration, CAL. LAW., Nov. 2003, at 37–38. 
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judgments, values, ideologies, attitudes, and pre-conceived 
perceptions. Like other human beings, mediators bring prejudices and 
preferences into the sessions. We should envision neutrality as an 
unending search, not a state of being.  
Realistically, pure impartiality cannot exist in a mediation setting. 
That said, we should not abandon neutrality as a goal. Rather, 
mediation practitioners and academics must seek greater 
understanding and candor about what is done in these confidential, 
closed-door encounters.  
Neutrality is not an attribute that mediators do, or do not, 
possess but it is an issue which must be attended to throughout 
a mediation and which requires constant process of evaluation 
and decision-making. . . . If we view neutrality through a 
binary lens, so that it is either present or absent, the research 
demonstrates as it must, that mediators are not neutral.‖297 
As mediators, we should increase our efforts to use the best practices 
to conduct the process in a way that integrates all aspects of 
neutrality, i.e., no compromising interests held by the mediator, 
procedural even-handedness, outcome neutrality, and without bias, 
prejudice or favoritism toward any party.
298
  
To fulfill our commitment to act in a nondiscriminatory manner, it 
is productive to conceive of mediator neutrality as having both 
external and internal components.
299
 External neutrality consists of 
conduct and statements to show freedom from bias or favoritism in 
the way the mediation is conducted. Internal neutrality is the state of 
being aware of the operation of biases toward the disputants and 
working to minimize it. I separate bias reduction ideas into these two 
distinct categories, but I recognize that they coalesce in certain 
instances. In addition to collecting views from a wide variety of 
observers, I offer experiences from my law school mediation 
programs as examples of potentially constructive approaches. 
 
 297. Astor, supra note 11, at 79–80. 
 298. See supra Part I. 
 299. Rock, supra note 50, at 355 (―Internal neutrality refers to the absence of emotions, 
values or agendas from the mind of the mediator. External neutrality refers to the absence of 
emotions, values or agendas from the words, actions, and appearance of the mediator.‖). 
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A. External Neutrality 
The external aspect of neutrality demands paying attention to 
process attributes, nuances of language and narrative, and the 
physicality of mediator actions. As practitioners, we are trained to 
attend to process management and procedures. We strive for external 
neutrality by conducting an outwardly even process, eliminating 
conflicts of interest that may arise from proprietary, monetary, 
relational, and other interests, and abstaining from advocating or 
pressing for a particular outcome. We seek to ensure our external 
neutrality through ―process policing‖ techniques: how we engage the 
parties, manage their interaction, and orchestrate the sessions.
300
 A 
large part of the mediator‘s job is ―maintaining the orderly character 
of talking and listening, including such matters as organizing the 
opening and the closing of the session, keeping the parties focused on 
the current topic, and managing the changes from one topic to 
another.‖301 Management of the agenda goes to the process of 
interaction, and therefore ―can be thought of as being executed in 
ways that are both formally and substantively neutral.‖302  
1. Process Management and Mediator Communication 
Mediators manifest external neutrality by being deliberate in 
planning and conducting each mediation to ―place and keep the 
power of self-determination with the parties, while protecting all 
parties‘ abilities to present issues and concerns equally in the 
mediation session.‖303 Practitioners should be mindful of the 
difference between even-handed process management and ―selective 
facilitation,‖ or maneuvers that are designed to influence and favor 
certain outcomes. These maneuvers include inhibiting discussion of a 
 
 300. External neutrality techniques would include the ―agenda management that goes on in 
any orchestrated encounter. . . . Orchestration is one of the means by which speech exchange is 
ordered in multi-party encounters.‖ Greatbatch & Dingwall, supra note 172, at 636 (citation 
omitted). 
 301. Id. at 637. 
 302. Id. 
 303. Rock, supra note 50, at 356. 
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disfavored option or moving to close a session without systematic 
exploration of both parties‘ preferences.304 
External neutrality should be assessed through all stages of the 
process, from pre-mediation preparation through post-mediation 
evaluation and debriefing. Rather than routinizing procedures for 
assembly line mediation, mediators should ―customize‖ the sessions 
for the special dynamics involved.
305
 Departure from procedural 
defaults may be more appropriate under the circumstances. The 
Michigan mediators followed the general rule for small claims 
mediation: they asked the party who initiated the matter to make his 
presentation first. The mediator team may have considered this to be 
a neutral selection, but it could be perceived as favoring the 
businessman and disadvantaging the homeowners. After inviting the 
business owner to speak first, the Michigan mediators posed more 
inquiries to the business owner than to the homeowners in the joint 
session and individual sessions. They may have devoted more time to 
the carpet cleaner and interacted less with the homeowners for 
various reasons (such as Mr. D‘s anger, the Ds‘ accents, or their 
―foreignness‖). 
External neutrality efforts include consideration of table 
arrangements and seating arrangements. In the Michigan scenario, the 
white male mediator sat closer to the business owner. Such an 
arrangement could create a more intimate conversational dynamic 
between the two men and give the impression they are ―chummy‖ or 
in alignment. Both homeowners were seated farther from the 
mediators than the business owner, making them seem like more 
remote ―outsiders.‖ Both homeowners should have been placed 
literally ―at the table,‖ rather than letting Mrs. D sit behind her 
husband. If one party is harder to comprehend (perhaps because of 
accent, soft voice, or looking down), the mediators could alter the 
arrangement and form a tight circle with no table. Mediators should 
be careful about chair placement and body positioning so as not to 
turn their backs toward one disputant more than the other. Special 
 
 304. Greatbatch & Dingwall, supra note 172, at 637–38. 
 305. ABA SECTION OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION, TASK FORCE ON IMPROVING MEDIATION 
QUALITY FINAL REPORT 12–13 (2008), available at http://www.abanet.org/dispute/documents/ 
FinalTaskForceMediation.pdf.  
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challenges may be presented when language interpreters or other 
third parties are in attendance, as this may make the unassisted party 
feel outmanned. Interpreters (of American sign language, for 
example) may need to be seated to accommodate the need to 
communicate adequately with their clients. Physical limitations of the 
participants should be considered with external neutrality in mind.
306
  
All subtleties of a mediator‘s mode of communication, including 
tone of voice, speed of speech, demeanor, eye contact, facial 
expressions, body language, and physical signals and gestures, are 
important for attending to external neutrality.
307
 Mediators who are 
fast talkers may disfavor or alienate parties who speak more slowly 
or who are less fluent in English. We need to be patient with parties 
who are less articulate or direct than ourselves, and refrain from 
interrupting, completing sentences, and filling space with words. 
Regional differences in speech patterns might create mediator affinity 
with one party over another.
308
 Unevenness in eye contact, body 
placement and movement (sitting forward or leaning back), and 
attentiveness (looking down while taking notes) may send signals of 
mediator approval or friendliness, or a lack thereof. When mediating 
with parties who have physical, cognitive, or intellectual disabilities, 
we must monitor habits that may inadvertently slight or alienate 
them. Mediators must be attuned to unintended differential or 
compensatory treatment (e.g., speaking in a loud voice to a party for 
whom English is a second language) that may be regarded as treating 
one participant more positively or negatively than the other. We 
should be aware of the inadequacy of our usual mannerisms with 
certain parties; for example, muted visual cues may disadvantage 
deaf parties who focus more on visual cues and facial expressions.  
 
 306. For instance, with my limited range of neck motion due to arthritis, as a mediator I 
must be seated so that I can make eye contact with and view all parties equally. 
 307. Rock, supra note 50, at 358. 
 308. For example, the East Coast students in my mediation clinic who talk as fast as a 
―New York minute‖ often get impatient with parties who speak slowly. 
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2. Language, Narratives, and Cultural Myths 
The importance of language in mediation cannot be overstated. 
Sarah Burns recommends that mediators be cognizant of the impact 
of metaphors.
309
 Common metaphors may be thought of as mere 
figures of speech, but they ―can have the effect of alienating, 
excluding, or seeming to disregard certain groups.‖310 Burns uses the 
example of metaphors in which black is a negative referent, which 
may be awkward or offensive to African Americans.
311
 Mediators 
should be sensitive to terms that may seem innocent but have a 
hurtful impact on others. An example from my own perspective is the 
acronym for ―Jewish American Princess,‖ ―JAP.‖ As a person of 
Japanese ancestry, I view that abbreviation as a homonym for a racial 
epithet. Stock phrases in mediation, such as ―I hear what you‘re 
saying,‖ may come across as insensitive to a hearing-impaired party. 
Dale Bagshaw observes that ―[l]anguage is laden with social values 
and both carries ideas and shapes ideas.‖312 Dominant discourses in 
Western societies tend to be Anglo-centric, as well as ―agist, racist, 
heterosexist and homophobic.‖313 Moreover, ―throughout recorded 
history such discourses have been used by legal and social science 
professionals to justify categorising people as ‗(un)deserving,‘ 
‗(ab)normal,‘ ‗(dys)functional,‘ ‗(in)competent,‘ ‗(mal)adjusted,‘ 
 
 309. Sarah E. Burns, Thinking About Fairness & Achieving Balance in Mediation, 35 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 39, 54 (2008). Burns‘ ―Practice Recommendations‖ are associated with 
five general aspects of cognition: categorization (naming our world), attribution (explaining our 
world), metaphor (orienting our world), normative (prescribing behaviors), and framing. Id. at 
43. 
 310. Id. at 54. 
 311. Id. (e.g., ―these were dark times‖ or ―he was one of the guys in a black hat‖). 
 312. Dale Bagshaw, Language, Power and Mediation, 14 AUSTRALASIAN DISP. RESOL. J. 
130, 136 (2003) (citing BENJAMIN LEE WHORF, LANGUAGE, THOUGHT, AND REALITY (John B. 
Carroll ed., 1956)).  
Dominant dispute resolution discourses in Western cultures have tended to favour 
adversarial approaches to conflict and rules of law applied in formal law courts are 
seen as the paramount ‗truths‘. However, ‗law‘ can be seen as a dominant discourse, 
elevated by a dominant group in a particular culture at a particular point in time, and as 
such can marginalise and ignore the ‗truths‘ or ways of knowing of minority cultural 
groups. 
Id. at 132. 
 313. Id. 
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‗subversive,‘ ‗delinquent‘ or ‗deviant.‘‖314 When analyzing 
discourses, Bagshaw notes that ―[i]t is therefore crucial to identify the 
relationship between what is said and who said it.‖315 With this 
understanding, discourse analysis may reveal sexist or racist 
assumptions. ―Language influences our attitudes and behaviour and 
can be used to reinforce harmful or hurtful stereotypes, such as those 
that are agist, sexist, racist and so forth.‖316  
Bagshaw cautions mediators ―to be careful in the choice of 
language, interpretations and the meanings they ascribe to a person‘s 
identity. Essentialism can contribute to mediators categorising and 
labelling clients and their problems in a way that impedes 
opportunities for client-centered practice and reifies and reinforces 
the power/knowledge of the mediator.‖317 To allow parties to ―supply 
the interpretive context for determining the meanings of events, the 
nature of a presenting problem, intervention and treatment,‖318 
Bagshaw urges a ―reflexive approach to [mediation] practice.‖319 ―In 
self-reflexive mediation practice it is recognised that it is impossible 
to be ‗neutral‘ and the influences of characteristics such as gender, 
race, class, age, and sexuality on the mediator‘s relationship with the 
participants are critically examined.‖320 Reflexivity demands 
awareness and control of the mediator‘s own personal and cultural 
biases ―in order to understand the standpoint of the ‗other.‘‖321 
Sara Cobb and Janet Rifkin also emphasize discourse and 
reflexivity in their critique of mediator neutrality. They view 
neutrality ―as a practice in discourse‖322 and assert that ―existing 
rhetoric about neutrality does not promote reflective critical 
examination of discursive processes.‖323 In their observations of 
 
 314. Id.  
 315. Id. at 136. 
 316. Id. at 137. 
 317. Id. at 139 (―Traits such as those linked to ethnicity, age, sexuality, ability or gender, 
should not be automatically assigned to a person‘s self-image as any one of those factors may 
not be seen by the person as relevant or important, depending on the context.‖).  
 318. Id. 
 319. Id.  
 320. Id. at 140. 
 321. Id. at 141. 
 322. Cobb & Rifkin, supra note 13, at 36. 
 323. Id. at 50. 
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mediators, they noted that mediators ―participate politically by asking 
questions and making summaries. Their questions bring the focus to 
one particular event sequence (plot), or particular story logic (theme), 
and/or adopt the character positions advanced by one disputant about 
another (character).‖324 In addition to mediator actions, ―the structure 
of the mediation session itself contributes to allowing one story to set 
the semantic and moral grounds on which discussion and dialogue 
can take place.‖325  
Cobb and Rifkin contend that in an effort to reduce 
adversarialness, mediators explore emotions, interests, fears, hopes, 
and needs which ―obscure[] the role of discourse in the session; the 
mediators cannot witness their own role in the creation of alternative 
stories, nor can they address the colonization of one story by 
another.‖326 The end result is that mediators contribute ―to the 
marginalization and delegitimization of disputants.‖327 For Cobb and 
Rifkin, 
[n]eutrality becomes a practice in discourse, specifically, the 
management of persons‘ positions in stories, the intervention 
in the associated interactional patterns between stories, and the 
construction of alternative stories. These processes require that 
mediators participate by shaping problems in ways that provide 
all speakers not only an opportunity to tell their story but a 
discursive opportunity to tell a story that does not contribute to 
their own delegitimization or marginalization (as is necessarily 
the case whenever one party disputes or contests a story in 
which the person is negatively positioned).
328
 
Drawing on the work of Cobb and Rifkin, Isabelle Gunning 
describes mediation as the interaction of narratives in which the 
parties compete over definitions, moral positioning, and descriptions 
 
 324. Id. at 54. 
 325. Id. at 56. 
 326. Id. at 59–60. Cobb and Rifkin ―recast ideology in mediation to encompass those 
discursive practices that privilege one story over another, that legitimize one speaker over 
another, that reduce any speaker‘s access to the storytelling process.‖ Id. at 51 (citing Stuart 
Hall, Signification, Representation, Ideology: Althusser and the Post-Structuralist Debates, 2 
CRITICAL STUD. IN MASS COMM. 91 (1985)). 
 327. Id. at 60. 
 328. Id. at 62. 
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of social relations.
329
 ―[T]he process of story-telling or narratives, 
while it has its positive aspects, may also be at the heart of the 
problem of bias in mediation.‖330 Conversational practice is such that 
the first, or ―primary,‖ narrative sets the sequential and interpretive 
framework, and subsequent narratives are constructed in relation to 
that primary narrative.
331
 Gunning cautions that speakers draw from 
the history and norms of the larger society, and when they draw on 
―bits and pieces of larger cultural myths‖ during the mediation 
process, ―they must choose some relevant socially constructed 
category for themselves and others.‖332 ―[T]he cultural myths 
surrounding identity groups involving disadvantaged group members 
are often both negative and purely based upon derogatory conjecture 
and assumptions about group members.‖333  
To heed these caveats about discursive practices, mediators should 
be extremely careful about making broad assumptions regarding a 
party‘s ―culture‖; ―the problem with identifying ‗cultural 
competence‘ as a form of neutrality is that it downplays the very real 
choice that mediators make in identifying ‗culture.‘‖334 In domestic 
mediations involving persons of color, generalizations about a 
disputant‘s cultural orientation based on race, ethnicity, or national 
origin may reflect stereotypical thinking, be over-inclusive, and be 
insulting to the party.
335
 Cynthia Savage argues that ―the common 
approach of defining ‗culture‘ as being synonymous with one facet of 
 
 329. Isabelle R. Gunning, Diversity Issues in Mediation: Controlling Negative Cultural 
Myths, 1995 J. DISP. RESOL. 55, 68. 
 330. Id.  
 331. Id. at 68–69. 
 332. Id. at 70. 
 333. Id. at 72. 
 334. Clark Freshman, Privatizing Same-Sex “Marriage” Through Alternative Dispute 
Resolution: Community-Enhancing Versus Community-Enabling Mediation, 44 UCLA L. REV. 
1687, 1757 (1997) (commenting on a mediation involving a Vietnamese couple and Canadian 
mediators where ―the problematic and unspoken assumption about ‗neutrality‘ and ‗cultural 
competence‘ is that the only relevant culture is Vietnamese culture‖). 
 335. For example, a statement that ―blacks might respond to the mediation context by being 
more expressive, using intense language as a means of communicating sincerity, or remaining 
fairly distant from the [white] mediator, which may increase the level of biased information 
coming from the disputing [black] couple‖ fails to account for vast differences among African 
Americans as individuals. See William A. Donohue, Ethnicity and Mediation, in 
COMMUNICATION, CULTURE, AND ORGANIZATIONAL PROCESSES 134, 147 (William B. 
Gudykunst et al. eds., 1985).  
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cultural identity, such as race, ethnicity, or gender, is a red herring 
which diverts attention from the search for a more accurate and 
constructive approach to exploring the impact of cultural diversity on 
mediation.‖336 Conflating culture with ethnicity may perpetuate 
stereotypes and ignore subcultures that contribute to an individual‘s 
cultural identity.
337
 
References to culture are particularly tricky when it comes to 
Asian Americans who are often mistakenly thought of as natives of 
Asian countries instead of U.S.-born citizens. Mia Tuan‘s study of 
the ―Asian ethnic experience‖ indicates that third- and fourth-
generation Asian Americans are generally highly assimilated to 
white, middle-class American mainstream cultural styles and values 
and do not retain Chinese or Japanese cultural traditions except for 
commemorative events.
338
 Despite this, ―Asian ethnics face societal 
expectations to be ethnic since others assume they should be closer to 
their ethnic roots than to their American ones.‖339 
Gunning exhorts us to explore cultural myths regarding 
disadvantaged group members in mediation through techniques such 
as ―race-switching,‖ or changing the races of the parties in a case 
study.
340
 In one example, she changes the race of one character from 
white to Asian. In so doing, she challenges us to contend with ―parts 
of the pre-existing narrative legitimized by the larger society, the 
myth that they are the ‗model minority‘.‖341 To prevent these cultural 
myths from contributing to or bolstering the primary narrative, 
Gunning contends that mediators must ―recognize that some of the 
cultural myths at work in the mediation process are drawn from 
negative taboos relating to disadvantaged groups.‖342 Gunning 
 
 336. Cynthia A. Savage, Culture and Mediation: A Red Herring, 5 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 
269, 271 (1996) (proposing a ―value orientation‖ framework as a useful way to explore cultural 
diversity in mediation). 
 337. Id. at 273. 
 338. MIA TUAN, FOREVER FOREIGNERS OR HONORARY WHITES?: THE ASIAN ETHNIC 
EXPERIENCE TODAY 155 (1998). 
 339. Id. at 156. 
 340. Gunning, supra note 329, at 74. 
 341. Id. at 75. Gunning observes, ―Specifically, Asian-Americans of various national 
origins face the cultural myth of immutable foreignness . . . . There is always the question with 
‗foreigners‘ that they don‘t really understand ‗our ways.‘‖ Id. 
 342. Id. at 80. 
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prescribes intervention to combat negative cultural myths. Her focus 
on mediator intervention is a situation in which the parties interject 
cultural myths, urging that the mediator ―may also need to flag for 
the parties that that is what is occurring.‖343 Turning the mirror 
around, I urge constant vigilance and self-correction for instances 
when the mediator is drawing on cultural myths.  
When we re-examine the Michigan mediation, we see a discursive 
example that disfavored and marginalized the homeowners. After the 
business owner presented his opening remarks and framed the dispute 
as a breach of contract case, the mediators questioned him in a way 
that reinforced his narrative. The homeowners tried to defend 
themselves by countering the allegation that they failed to 
comprehend or follow his instructions by shutting the basement door. 
By asking for the return of the first payment, the homeowners 
appeared unreasonable. If the mediators had invited the homeowners 
to go first in the joint session or had refrained from bolstering the 
carpet cleaner‘s narrative, the matter may have been framed as a 
contractor overselling his abilities and overcharging the customers.  
We can imagine how the Asian American negative cultural myth 
of ―immutable foreignness‖ may have bled into the Michigan 
mediation. In the mediators‘ encounter with the homeowners, the 
―simultaneous operation of excitatory and inhibitory cognitive 
processes‖ may have determined one category to be more dominant, 
and the other more suppressed.
344
 If the mediators perceive the 
homeowners‘ racial category as dominant, xenophobic and race-
based biases may have operated against the couple. 
3. Reflexivity and Role-Playing  
Bagshaw, Cobb, and Rifkin, among others, advocate reflexivity in 
mediation practice as a check on prejudiced subjectivity. Susan 
Douglas urges mediators to abandon attempts at objectivity and to 
instead examine one‘s own experiences within the mediation.345 
 
 343. Id.  
 344. C. Neil Macrae et al., The Dissection of Selection in Person Perception: Inhibitory 
Processes in Social Stereotyping, 69 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 397, 404 (1995).  
 345. Douglas, supra note 35, at 62. 
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Douglas endorses reflexivity as ―a useful means of conceptualising 
both the impact of mediator predispositions and the co-construction 
of meaning within the encounter.‖346 Viewed this way, ―reflexivity 
represents a rejection of mediator neutrality (in any absolute sense), 
an acknowledgement of the impact of mediator subjectivity and a 
means of addressing that subjectivity in practice.‖347  
Echoing these views, Linda Mulcahy claims that her study of 
community mediation validates a reflexive approach in mediation.
348
 
Her empirical research examined one of the largest community 
organizations in the United Kingdom.
349
 The mediators in her study 
admitted to having difficulty ignoring personal bias and their 
subjective evaluations of the merit of particular claims and parties.
350
 
Acknowledging these feelings, the co-mediators had debriefing 
sessions to discuss how their personal assessments impacted option 
development and process management.
351
 
The Michigan mediators should have adopted reflexivity as an 
anti-bias method of self-assessment throughout the session. After 
reading the file in the small claims case, the mediators could have 
discussed initial reactions, assumptions, and potential issues of bias 
during their preparatory caucus. After the joint session, the mediators 
would have benefitted from a co-mediator caucus to exchange views 
about the parties and their respective demands. They could have 
made appropriate adjustments in the individual sessions to counter 
non-neutral thoughts and behavior. Similarly, a reflexive co-mediator 
discussion after each individual session may have enabled the pair to 
steer the mediation in a direction that was more beneficial for the 
parties. Even if the parties ultimately reached an impasse, they may 
have gained a fuller understanding of the situation and of one 
another‘s perspectives and principles. By diluting the homeowners‘ 
 
 346. Id. at 63 (―Reflexivity as mutual collaboration highlights the active role of the 
mediator in mutually reflexive dialogue . . . . Unavoidably, the mediator, rather than being a 
neutral facilitator of conversations, is an active coauthor in the construction of dispute 
narratives.‖). 
 347. Id. at 65. 
 348. Mulcahy, supra note 162, at 517. 
 349. Id. at 515. 
 350. Id. at 516. 
 351. Id. at 517. 
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narrative and failing to explore a range of options, the mediators 
legitimized the business owner‘s version of entitlement. 
Through the use of various practices, we attempt to incorporate 
discursive and reflective theories in a law school mediation clinic. As 
Cobb, Rifkin, and Gunning make apparent, the party who speaks first 
has the advantage of painting a subjective picture of the 
circumstances underlying the dispute.
352
 Student-mediators are eager 
to ask a litany of ―fact-gathering‖ questions (to the point of 
interrogation) to the first speaker before listening to the second 
speaker‘s narrative. By doing so, students add their own ―spin‖ and 
make assumptions that may be tainted by their own experiences and 
expectations. Thus, they may re-characterize or validate the first 
speaker‘s presentation through their own additions. Rather than 
presenting her own ―story,‖ the second speaker is reduced to 
opposing a pre-determined version embellished by the mediators. 
This can frustrate and incite defensiveness in the second speaker who 
has been asked to wait her turn and not interrupt.  
Recognizing this dynamic, students are directed to refrain from 
asking questions until both parties have had the opportunity to supply 
their narratives in their own words and styles. In what may be an 
atypical practice, we refrain from summarizing and reframing the 
first person‘s statements before the second person speaks. While 
there is always some perceived favoritism that one party goes first, 
withholding questions and postponing summarizing or reframing 
lessens the likelihood that the second speaker‘s narrative will be 
molded by others.  
It is also important to model lack of bias in selecting the party 
who speaks first. Asking the parties who would like to go first may 
be perceived as rewarding one party over the other (the more 
assertive party or the one closest to the mediator, for example). 
Mediators evidence external neutrality by being transparent in 
decision-making. Parties should be told why and how the mediators 
determined the order of presentations (for example, a random method 
of selection, such as by alphabetical order or coin toss). 
 
 352. Gunning, supra note 329, at 68–70. 
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Reflective learning has been described as ―an intentional social 
process, where context and experience are acknowledged, in which 
learners are active individuals, wholly present, engaging with others, 
open to challenge, and the outcome involves transformation as well 
as improvement for both individuals and their environment.‖353 Like 
many clinical legal educators, I have included role-playing exercises 
as a reflective teaching opportunity in the mediation clinic for 
decades.
354
 Role-plays contain the essential elements of learning and 
reflection: (1) ―a genuine situation of experience‖; (2) a ―genuine 
problem in that situation‖; (3) ―information and observation about the 
situation‖; (4) ―suggested solutions for which the student [is] 
responsible‖; and (5) ―opportunity . . . to test ideas by application.‖355 
By practicing in an academic setting, students will (hopefully) 
transfer the lessons to their actual cases.  
My mediation clinic students participate in five increasingly 
difficult two-hour role-plays as parties, co-mediators, and 
observers.
356
 In addition to helping the students to improve their 
mediation skills, the role-plays enable the students to develop 
empathy and view the process from the perspective of the disputants. 
Students are encouraged to experiment and put ideas into action. 
During the role-plays, mediators explore their decision-making 
processes, assess progress, and consider their reactions to options. 
Mediators are asked to express how their thoughts and feelings 
motivated them and evaluate to what extent they pushed options.
357
 
During class discussion, we deconstruct the mediation role-play and 
 
 353. Samantha Hardy, Teaching Mediation as Reflective Practice, 25 NEGOTIATION J. 385, 
389 (2009) (quoting ANNE BROCKBANK & IAN MCGILL, FACILITATING REFLECTIVE LEARNING 
IN HIGHER EDUCATION 36 (2d ed. 2007)). 
 354. For a critique of role-plays as a learning activity, see Nadja Alexander & Michelle 
LaBaron, Death of the Role-Play, in RETHINKING NEGOTIATION TEACHING: INNOVATIONS FOR 
CONTEXT AND CULTURE 179, 179–97 (Christopher Honeyman et al. eds., 2009). 
 355. Hardy, supra note 353, at 390 (citing BROCKBANK & MCGILL, supra note 353, at 23). 
 356. By this time, they have also viewed a small claims mediation at the courthouse, 
observed an in-class mock mediation demonstration by experienced mediators, and engaged in 
skills development exercises. 
 357. Hardy, supra note 353, at 397 (quoting MICHAEL D. LANG & ALISON TAYLOR, THE 
MAKING OF A MEDIATOR: DEVELOPING ARTISTRY IN PRACTICE 54 (2000)) (―Elicitive 
questioning‖ presses ―mediators to uncover for themselves what was successful or 
unsuccessful, and to identify the reasoning behind their strategies and approaches, and . . . 
consider the impact of their interventions on the disputants.‖). 
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all students offer oral comments. Both the students and the instructors 
also complete written critiques.
358
 The purpose of feedback is not 
merely to give mediators a ―360 degree‖ evaluation but also to allow 
the students and instructors to engage in collective problem-solving 
and to examine assumptions and reactions.
359
 We record the role-
plays and make them available for students to view on their laptops. 
By watching their performances and the reactions of the parties, 
student mediators can see or contest the validity of the feedback that 
was offered. They can also see if they were guilty of behavior that 
reflected bias or favoritism, such as facial expressions, body 
language, or blinking.  
Mediation teachers and trainers should answer Gunning‘s call for 
more deliberate confrontation of racial stereotypes and assumptions 
in training.
360
 With that goal in mind, I designed a role-play 
simulation based on community tensions in Washington, D.C., for 
use in my mediation course.
361
 It is a composite of disputes arising 
out of years of ongoing tension between Korean American 
shopkeepers and African American customers.
362
 I have varied my 
approach over time. I initially played the shopkeeper and later opted 
to recruit volunteers from student groups to play the disputants. For 
 
 358. Students complete evaluations as mediators, parties, and observers. 
 359. Hardy, supra note 353, at 393 (quoting BROCKBANK & MCGILL, supra note 353, at 
5). In this way, ―learners and teacher engage and work together so that they jointly construct 
meaning and knowledge from the material.‖ Id. 
 360. Gunning, supra note 329, at 86–88. 
 361. In fact, as a participant at a conference hosted by the UCLA Center for Study and 
Resolution of Interracial/Interethnic Conflict, March 28–30, 1996, Professor Gunning offered 
constructive comments to refine the role-play. For an analysis of Black-Korean tension, see 
Kyeyoung Park, Use and Abuse of Race and Culture: Black-Korean Tension in America, in THE 
CONFLICT AND CULTURE READER 152, 152–62 (Pat K. Chew ed., 2001). 
 362. See, e.g., Michael A. Fletcher, Asian-Owned Carryout is Focus of Rally: Small Group 
Protests Nonblack Business, WASH. POST, Oct. 19, 1996, at D4 (reporting on African American 
protestors engaged in a protest rally outside of an Asian-American restaurant in D.C.); see also 
Mayor‟s Proposed Fiscal Year 2010 Budget: Before the Committee on Aging and Community 
Affairs, Apr. 24, 2009 (statement of Francey Youngberg, Chair, DC Fair Access Coalition) 
(―According to the Washington Post, two-thirds of all business licenses are owned by Asian 
Pacific Americans in the District. D.C. agencies estimate that 60% of corner groceries and 57% 
of lotteries are sold through Asian-owned stores.‖) (copy on file with author). According to the 
2000 U.S. Census, roughly 60 percent of D.C. residents are black. District of Columbia-DP-1. 
Profile of General Demographic Characteristics: 2000, CENSUS.GOV, http://factfinder.census. 
gov/servlet/QTTable?_bm=y&-geo_id=04000US11&-qr_name=DEC_2000_SF1_U_DP1&ds_ 
name (last visited Nov. 8, 2010). 
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the past few years, I have shown a videotape demonstration; this 
technique has the advantage of making the discussion about process 
dynamics and co-mediator choices easier. The demonstration allows 
students to discuss stereotypes, prejudice, and bias in a controlled and 
confidential setting. We also use other role-plays and scenarios that 
involve racial or gender dynamics. 
4. Co-Mediation and Race-Matching 
Co-mediation offers a number of advantages for advancing 
external neutrality.
363
 We use a co-mediation model exclusively in 
our community program.
364
 Having ―two heads‖ allows the co-
mediator team to engage in an explicit discussion of how ―neutrally‖ 
they are operating within a particular mediation context.
365
 In co-
mediator caucuses, the team can engage in active reflection to assess 
the discursive dialogues, interactions with and between disputants, 
and inclinations to favor or disfavor options. Rather than rushing to 
an agreement on approach and actions, co-mediators can play 
―devil‘s advocate‖ to affirmatively critique their behavior and 
choices. A co-mediator provides the eyes and ears for peer 
evaluation. Although mediators may be reluctant to offer constructive 
criticism (since it is not anonymous), a mutual co-mediator 
evaluation can incorporate elements of debriefing, reflection, positive 
feedback, and suggestions for future improvement. These co-
mediator assessments would provide a useful supplement to party 
evaluations, which are employed by most mediation programs. Peer 
evaluation of mediators could be accomplished in other ways. For 
example, the D.C. Superior Court Multi-Door Dispute Resolution 
Branch uses a one-way mirror so evaluators can observe mediations 
without being seen by the participants.  
 
 363. Gunning, supra note 329, at 88–89 (citing the benefits of using mediator teams to 
combat negative cultural myths).  
 364. Students in my Consumer Mediation Clinic are sole mediators of consumer-business 
disputes, whereas students in my Community Dispute Resolution Center Project co-mediate 
adult misdemeanor, juvenile delinquency, and police-civilian disputes. 
 365. For good suggestions on making the most of co-mediation, see Lela P. Love & Joseph 
B. Stulberg, Practice Guidelines for Co-Mediation: Making Certain That “Two Heads Are 
Better Than One,‖ 13 MEDIATION Q. 179 (1996).  
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Co-mediation also leverages differences in perspectives and 
experiences when you have mediators of different ethnicities, 
genders, or abilities.
366
 This can provide a check on biased and 
discriminatory mediator actions. For example, a female mediator 
might help her male partner avoid gendered comments and 
assumptions. In some mediation contexts, pairing mediators is done 
deliberately and strategically to create complementary duos.
367
 
Advocates of ―race-matching‖ co-mediator teams to mirror the racial 
or ethnic distribution of the parties cite several benefits: symbolic 
fairness, increased likelihood that mediators and parties will have 
shared experiences, modeling equality, and broader interpretive 
frameworks.
368
  
Clark Freshman points out several dangers of matching parties 
with mediators based on common traits or affiliations.
369
 ―First, 
psychologists have found it notoriously difficult to predict precisely 
how individuals, be they mediators or not, will see some as ‗we‘ and 
others as ‗they.‘‖370 Second, there may be biases within individual 
communities. ―Leading psychologists of discrimination suggest that, 
as much as we think we know how others see themselves, individuals 
may divide the world in many different ways.‖371 He adds that ―[a] 
reciprocal problem may arise when some who identify strongly with 
a community have negative views of those who they feel have 
betrayed their ‗true‘ identity by trying to assimilate or fit some other 
community instead.‖372 Another problem with matching mediators is 
that the practice may exacerbate discrimination outside the 
community.
373
 This operates in two ways: positive contact with 
 
 366. Gunning, supra note 329, at 88–89.  
 367. For example, in emotional family disputes, a team containing a lawyer and therapeutic 
counselor might be beneficial. In a heterosexual divorce, a male and female mediator team 
might be used. Id. at 88.  
 368. Id. at 89. 
 369. Clark Freshman, The Promise and Perils of “Our” Justice: Psychological, Critical 
and Economic Perspectives on Communities and Prejudices in Mediation, 6 CARDOZO J. 
CONFLICT RESOL. 1, 10–11 (2004). 
 370. Id. at 10. 
 371. Id. at 11. Freshman uses the example of relatively assimilated Jews who ―may often 
express more negative views about those not assimilated than even the most inside group.‖ Id. 
at 12. 
 372. Id. 
 373. Id. 
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dissimilar persons often reduces prejudice, and unconscious bias 
against the group may become less prevalent.
374
  
Furthermore, race-matching risks essentialism and reflects 
reductionist assumptions about individuals.
375
 Amartya Sen describes 
a kind of reductionism that he refers to as ―singular affiliation.‖376 
This reductionism ―takes the form of assuming that any person 
preeminently belongs, for all practical purposes, to one collectivity 
only—no more and no less. Of course, we do know in fact that any 
real human being belongs to many groups, through birth, 
associations, and alliances.‖377 Individuals should be able to choose 
which affiliations are more relevant or important in any social context 
and not have others impose that on them; political affiliation or 
religion, for example, may trump race.
378
 Race-matching the 
mediators for parties of Asian descent ignores ethnic, national, 
regional, political, religious, socio-economic, and other differences 
that may be more relevant or important in a given situation than 
shared racial category.
379
  
Finally, a study of race-matching revealed that ―[w]ith regard to 
mediation outcomes . . . it is not so clear that creating racial matches 
between mediation participants and mediators is as important as we 
have thought in the past.‖380 A multiyear research project in 
Maryland community mediation centers determined that  
when the mediator is not of the same race as either participant, 
participants believe that they have been heard by the mediator. 
In contrast, when the mediator‘s race matches that of the 
opposing party, the participant is less likely to feel that the 
 
 374. Id. at 12–13. Freshman also notes that matching could ―trigger the unconscious 
stereotype that ‗they‘ are clannish.‖ Id. at 13. Moreover, ―even if one adopts the less separatist 
notion of teaching cultural ‗sensitivity‘ to mediators . . . the ‗sensitivity‘ may harden the way 
mediators automatically divide the world into group terms.‖ Id.  
 375. See Bagshaw, supra note 312, at 139 (discussing the dangers of essentialism and 
assigning possibly irrelevant traits to a person‘s self-image). 
 376. AMARTYA SEN, IDENTITY AND VIOLENCE: THE ILLUSION OF DESTINY 20 (2006).  
 377. Id. 
 378. Id. at 29–32. 
 379. Bagshaw, supra note 312, at 139. 
 380. Lorig Charkoudian & Ellen Kabcenell Wayne, Does It Matter If My Mediator Looks 
Like Me? The Impact of Racially Matching Participants and Mediators, DISP. RESOL. MAG., 
Spring 2009, at 22, 24. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol34/iss1/4
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2010]  Implicit Bias and the Illusion of Mediator Neutrality 139 
 
 
mediator listened to her. A similar negative effect occurs with 
regard to participants‘ sense of control over the conflict 
situation. This sense of control does not change when the 
mediators‘ race is different from both participants, but 
decreases from the beginning to the end of the mediation when 
the mediator‘s race matches only that of the opposing party. 
Again, it appears less important to have a mediator who ‗looks 
like me‘ than it is to avoid having a mediator who ‗looks like‘ 
the other participant and no mediator who ‗looks like me.‘381 
The researchers suggest that their finding supports ―the value of co-
mediation, which creates more options for addressing racial balance 
amongst participants and mediators.‖382  
5. Transformative Mediation and Procedural Justice 
Transformative mediation and procedural justice theories suggest 
that external neutrality would be improved through a process that 
ensures a high degree of control for the disputants. Joseph Folger and 
Robert Baruch Bush postulate that neutrality is unachievable because 
the mediator‘s interests become part of the problem-solving 
endeavor; they propose that their transformative model ensures party 
self-determination.
383
 They contend that a problem-solving 
mediation, which focuses on reaching agreement, ―leads mediators to 
be directive in shaping both the problems and the solutions, and they 
wind up influencing the outcome of mediations in favor of settlement 
generally and in favor of terms of settlement that comport with their 
views of fairness, optimality, and so forth.‖384 In transformative 
mediation, ―[n]eutrality means that the mediator‘s only interest is the 
interest in using his or her influence to make sure that the parties 
maintain control of decisions about outcomes.‖385  
 
 381. Id. at 24. 
 382. Id.  
 383. ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION: THE 
TRANSFORMATIVE APPROACH TO CONFLICT 22–26, 105 (rev. ed. 2005).  
 384. Id. at 104. 
 385. Id. at 105. Astor also endorses an approach that emphasizes self-determination, party 
empowerment, and collaboration between the parties. Astor, supra note 11, at 78. 
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Mary Beth Howe and Robert Fiala analyzed randomly assigned 
small claims court mediation cases in New Mexico to evaluate factors 
affecting disputant satisfaction with mediation.
386
 Data from the study 
show that certain factors in the mediator‘s control are strongly 
associated with party satisfaction. For example, party satisfaction 
increases when ―the mediator appears neutral, is in control of the 
mediation, and allows participants to feel they are able to tell their 
story. Greater participant integration, less anger and hostility, and 
greater power in mediation are also linked to satisfaction.‖387 
Structural factors associated with social class, gender, and ethnicity 
showed ―few and inconsistent links to satisfaction.‖388  
In her exegesis of procedural justice literature, Rebecca 
Hollander-Blumoff identifies four dominant factors in assessments of 
process fairness: ―opportunity for voice, courteous and respectful 
treatment, trustworthiness of the decision-maker, and neutrality of the 
decision-maker.‖389 Procedural justice legitimizes the mediation 
process and increases the likelihood that the outcome will be 
accepted by the participants. In their well-known compilation of 
studies of dispute resolution systems, John Thibaut and Laurens 
Walker concluded that ―the maintenance of a high degree of control 
. . . by disputants and, at the same time, . . . a high degree of regulated 
contentiousness between the disputants themselves‖ are important 
properties for a just procedure.
390
 Their research revealed ―that a 
procedure that limits third-party control, thus allocating the 
preponderance of control to the disputants, constitutes a just 
procedure.‖391 
In short, we can draw upon multiple lessons to check external 
neutrality. Neutrality is promoted by managing the mediation process 
to maintain even-handed, respectful treatment of disputants and by 
 
 386. Mary Beth Howe & Robert Fiala, Process Matters: Disputant Satisfaction in 
Mediated Civil Cases, 29 JUST. SYS. J. 85 (2008). 
 387. Id. at 93. 
 388. Id. at 94. 
 389. Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, The Theoretical and Empirical Case for Procedural 
Justice in Negotiation 9 (Sept. 9, 2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).  
 390. JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL 
ANALYSIS 119 (1975).  
 391. Id. at 118. 
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maximizing party control. In addition, mediators can attend to 
external neutrality concerns by: being sensitive to language usage; 
valuing individual party narratives; ensuring that disputants ―tell their 
stories‖ in their own words and style; self-policing for essentialist 
assumptions; and monitoring for biased party interventions. Finally, 
adopting a reflexive approach that is deliberatively self-conscious; 
using co-mediator teams that leverage differences and similarities; 
and employing instructional methods that require mediators to 
grapple with racial and other difficult issues would further reduce the 
potential for mediator partiality and bias. 
B. Internal Neutrality 
Having identified steps a mediator may undertake to address 
external neutrality issues, we now look inward to consider what 
mediators can do to minimize the operation of biased mental 
processes that are automatic and not a part of our conscious 
awareness. Research shows that suppression of stereotyped 
associations and engagement of non-prejudiced responses requires 
―intention, attention, and effort.‖392 Fortunately, mediators have the 
power and ability to improve internal neutrality measures to reduce 
bias and favoritism in mediation. Practical suggestions include setting 
goals, planning deliberate actions to reduce biased responses, 
increasing diversity of mediator contacts, applying mindfulness 
techniques, and developing a habit of practices that remove bias.  
1. Awareness, Motivation, and Action 
Awareness of bias is critical for mental decontamination 
success.
393
 As one may expect, the first step toward internal neutrality 
is to acknowledge the existence of unconscious mediator biases and 
 
 392. Armour, supra note 144, at 24 (quoting Patricia G. Devine, Stereotypes and 
Prejudice: Their Automatic and Controlled Components, 56 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
5, 16 (1989)). 
 393. Laurie A. Rudman et al., “Unlearning” Automatic Biases: The Malleability of Implicit 
Prejudice and Stereotypes, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 856, 866 (2001) (citing 
Timothy D. Wilson & Nancy Brekke, Mental Contamination and Mental Correction: 
Unwanted Influences on Judgments and Evaluations, PSYCHOL. BULL. 117, 117–42 (1994)).  
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prejudices. ―[I]n order to counter otherwise automatic behavior, one 
must accept the existence of the problem in the first place. . . . We 
must be both aware of the bias and motivated to counter it. If we 
instead trust our own explicit self-reports about bias—namely, that 
we have none—we will have no motivation to self-correct.‖394 
Requiring mediators to take the IAT for an implicit bias ―reality 
check‖ could potentially open their eyes to their own egalitarian 
shortcomings. I ask my students to do such an exercise early in the 
semester.
395
 Although it is voluntary, I request that they take one of 
the implicit association tests and complete a questionnaire 
anonymously.
396
 During the semester, we reflect on and refer back to 
the experience as it relates to actual cases. 
When confronted with their own implicit attitudes and 
stereotypes, mediators can work to counter the operation of bias. 
With increased awareness of implicit bias and the goals and 
motivation to self-correct, mediators can begin to tackle the problem 
of unintentional unequal treatment of parties. Researchers found that 
merely knowing one‘s prejudice level was not sufficient to respond in 
a less prejudiced manner.
397
 People who are externally motivated 
(wanting to appear non-prejudiced to other people) to reduce 
prejudice-related reactions are more likely to adjust a prejudiced act 
based on the social context they are in, while those who are only 
internally motivated (appearing non-prejudiced to oneself) may not 
be so affected by social pressures.
398
 It is possible ―that external 
motivation precedes internal motivation and that to initiate change, 
the social climate must discourage expressions of prejudice.‖399 The 
 
 394. Kang, supra note 136, at 1529.  
 395. I got this idea from Gary Blasi, who posted an e-mail on the clinical list serve on 
August 1, 2007, in response to Gail Silverstein‘s inquiry about incorporating the IAT in clinic 
courses. Blasi explained that he has used the IAT, but he always used it in conjunction with 
reading and discussion of the science behind the IAT and the implication for lawyers.‖ E-Mail 
from Gary Blasi, Professor of Law, UCLA Sch. of Law, to Gail Silverstein, Clinical Att‘y, 
Civil Justice Ctr., Univ. of Cal. Hastings Coll. of Law (Aug. 1, 2007, 12:21:53 PST) (on file 
with author). 
 396. The simple questionnaire asks for their reactions and reflections on the test experience 
and their ―scores.‖ 
 397. E. Ashby Plant & Patricia G. Devine, Internal and External Motivation to Respond 
Without Prejudice, 75 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 811, 826 (1998). 
 398. Id. at 825. 
 399. Id. at 827. 
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researchers observed that ―although discouraging overtly prejudiced 
responses may be desirable, it appears that internal motivation may 
be necessary to sustain efforts to respond without prejudice over 
time, particularly when no immediate external standards are 
salient.‖400  
Recent studies show that while stereotypes may be automatically 
activated, as conscious actors we may be able to affect the 
application of those stereotypes in our interactions, judgments, and 
decisions. Irene Blair and Mahzarin Banaji conducted a series of four 
experiments to observe the automatic activation of gender stereotypes 
and to assess conditions under which stereotype priming may be 
moderated.
401
 They distinguish between stereotype activation 
(categorization) and stereotype application as sequential steps in the 
process. They believe that stereotype activation is an automatic 
process, whereas stereotype application is a controlled, or at least a 
controllable, process.
402
 Their experiments revealed that even with 
the ―strong and ubiquitous nature of stereotype priming, . . . such 
effects may be moderated under particular conditions. . . . 
[s]tereotype priming can be eliminated when perceivers have an 
intention to process counterstereotypic information and sufficient 
cognitive resources are available.‖403    
In another experiment on reducing the application of stereotypes, 
Margo Monteith observed that low prejudiced individuals 
experienced prejudice-related discrepancies (i.e., a prejudiced 
response such as feeling uncomfortable sitting next to a gay male on 
a bus) even though they believed the response was inappropriate.
404
 
She investigated whether people can inhibit prejudiced responses and 
 
 400. Id. (citing David P. Ausubel, Relationships Between Shame and Guilt in the 
Socializing Process, 62 PSYCHOL. REV. 378, 378–90 (1955)). Later studies determined the 
importance of internal motivation, finding that the measure of implicit bias was lowest among 
individuals with high levels of internal motivation and low level of external motivation. See 
Patricia G. Devine et al., The Regulation of Explicit and Implicit Race Bias: The Role of 
Motivations to Respond Without Prejudice, 82 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 835 (2002). 
 401. Irene V. Blair & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Automatic and Controlled Processes in 
Stereotype Priming, 70 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1142 (1996). 
 402. Id. at 1143. 
 403. Id. at 1159.  
 404. Margo J. Monteith, Self-Regulation of Prejudiced Responses: Implications for 
Progress in Prejudice-Reduction Efforts, 65 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 469, 469 
(1993). 
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respond on the basis of personal non-prejudiced beliefs.
405
 She found 
that the discrepancy experience produced a negative self-directed 
effect which increased motivation for discrepancy reduction.
406
 
Increased attention to discrepancy-relevant information and personal 
discrepancy experiences may help low prejudiced individuals exert 
control over their biased responses.
407
 Importantly, she found that 
―prejudice-related discrepancy experience enabled the low prejudiced 
subjects to be more effective at inhibiting prejudiced responses at a 
later time.‖408  
In addition to recognizing implicit bias and having adequate 
motivation to reduce it, mediators must call upon cognitive control 
processes. Blair and Banaji‘s experiments examined the automatic 
processes underlying stereotyping and the role of intention and 
cognitive resources in moderating the influence of such processes on 
one‘s judgment.409 The results suggest that people can control or 
eliminate the effect of stereotypes on their judgments if they have the 
intention to do so and their cognitive resources are not over-
constrained.
410
 After reviewing numerous studies, Blair discovered 
that automatic stereotypes are influenced by social and self-motives, 
specific strategies, the perceiver‘s focus of attention, and the 
configuration of stimulus cues.
411
 In a study by Bruce Bartholow and 
colleagues, participants drinking alcohol showed significantly 
impaired regulative cognitive control and diminished ability to inhibit 
race-biased responses, suggesting that controlling racial bias can be a 
function of implementing cognitive control processes.
412
 
With the requisite motivation and cognitive resources to draw 
upon, mediators are ready to operationalize a bias reduction plan. 
Gollwitzer, Sayer, and McCulloch propose ―implementation-
 
 405. Id. at 472. 
 406. Id. at 477.  
 407. Id. (citing JEFFREY A. GRAY, THE NEUROPSYCHOLOGY OF ANXIETY: AN ENQUIRY 
INTO THE FUNCTIONS OF THE SEPTOHIPPOCAMPAL SYSTEM (1982)).  
 408. Id. at 482. 
 409. Blair & Banaji, supra note 401, at 1142. 
 410. Id. at 1159. 
 411. Blair, supra note 85, at 242.  
 412. Bruce D. Bartholow et al., Stereotype Activation and Control of Race Bias: Cognitive 
Control of Inhibition and Its Impairment by Alcohol, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 272 
(2006).  
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intention‖ as an approach to situations that may trigger implicit bias 
responses.
413
 Goal-intention is expressed as ―I intend to reach X 
goal.‖414 Goal-directed behavior is important, but might not become 
part of everyday routine. ―As a substitute, people can resort to 
forming implementation-intentions that strategically place the 
intended goal-directed behavior under direct situational control.‖415 
Implementation-intention is expressed as ―if X, then I will do Y.‖416 
Implementation intentions are expressed as plans to reach the goal.
417
 
Implementation intention studies have shown promising results: 
participants were generally more likely to attain their goals, were 
more resistant to distracters, and showed less stereotype activation.
418
 
Applying these strategies to mediation clinics and programs, 
instructors and administrators should articulate explicit program 
goals and guidelines about expected mediator non-prejudiced 
behavior and incentivize actions to meet those goals. In one example 
of an interesting innovation, the American Bar Association (ABA) 
has offered a continuing legal education program on ―Creating a 
Culture of Inclusion‖ and made available ―Elimination of Bias 
Credit.‖419 In lieu of the typical pro forma ―diversity‖ segment in 
mediation trainings, teachers and trainers should consider a more 
robust anti-prejudice curriculum. Gunning advocates inclusion of 
―misperceptions of different identity groups as part of the mediation 
training. These discussions and explorations would and should be a 
 
 413. Peter M. Gollwitzer et al., The Control of the Unwanted, in THE NEW UNCONSCIOUS 
485, 486–87 (Ran R. Hassin et al. eds., 2005). 
 414. Id. at 487. 
 415. Id. at 486. 
 416. Id. at 486–87. 
 417. Gollwitzer and his colleagues use this example:  
When participants had furnished their goal intentions of judging the elderly in a 
nonstereotypical manner with the respective implementation intention (―If I see an old 
person, then I will tell myself: Don‘t stereotype!‖), the typical automatic activation of 
stereotypical beliefs . . . was even reversed. Similarly, when participants had the goal 
intention to judge female job applicants in a nonstereotypical manner and furnished an 
implementation intention to ignore a certain applicant‘s gender, no automatic 
activation of stereotypical beliefs about the female was observed.  
Id. at 495. 
 418. Id. at 496. 
 419. Am. Bar Ass‘n Ctr. for Continuing Legal Educ., Creating a Culture of Inclusion, AM. 
BAR ASS‘N, http://www.abanet.org/cle/programs/t10cci1.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2010).  
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part of the basic mediation training not relegated as they so often are 
to some advanced form of training on ‗cross-cultural mediation‘ or 
‗how to deal with power-imbalances‘.‖420 Mandatory continuing 
mediation education for mediators practicing in particular programs 
or jurisdictions could include ―elimination of bias‖ credits and 
certification of anti-bias coursework.  
In addition to the normative (external) incentive, mediators must 
set their own personal (internal) goals of egalitarianism. A general 
aspiration to be ―neutral‖ is insufficiently specific. To achieve more 
fairness in mediation, Burns recommends that mediators affirm that 
their goal is to be fair and non-discriminatory.
421
 She also urges 
mediators to monitor how they make distinctions and to assume they 
are biased in favor of members of their own group and against 
persons in other groups.
422
 Internally motivated mediators should 
develop their own ―intention-implementation plans‖ for goal 
attainment and tailor them for specific mediation settings. As part of 
pre-mediation preparation, mediators should consider potential bias 
pitfalls that might arise in interracial disputes and develop reaction 
plans to avoid or escape the traps. 
2. Salience, Exposure, and Practice 
Racially discriminatory behavior may be reduced more effectively 
when racial issues are made salient rather than ignored or 
obscured.
423
 Research shows that focusing attention on the source of 
a possible implicit effect that interferes with judgment reduces or 
eliminates (or even reverses) the interference.
424
 For example, the 
false fame effect was reduced when sufficient attention was focused 
on the initial list of non-famous names so the subjects would 
recognize non-famous names as having been encountered earlier in 
 
 420. Gunning, supra note 329, at 87. 
 421. Burns, supra note 309, at 44.  
 422. Id. at 45. ―[E]ven if one somehow has been consciously oblivious to the presence of 
key social differences, failing to consider the effects of social difference is the strategy most 
likely to perpetuate historic patterns of bias.‖ Id. at 50. 
 423. Wang, supra note 210, at 1038 (citing Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, 
White Juror Bias: An Investigation of Prejudice Against Black Defendants in the American 
Courtroom, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL‘Y & L. 201, 220–21 (2001)). 
 424. Greenwald & Banaji, supra note 67, at 18. 
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the experiment.
425
 ―Drawing social category information into 
conscious awareness allows mental (cognitive and motivational) 
resources to overrule the consciously unwanted but unconsciously 
operative response.‖426  
Taking a similar view, Jody Armour agrees that decision-makers 
would be more likely to become aware of their implicit biases, 
confront them, and hopefully counteract their effects when such 
references are explicitly made.
427
 Citing the distinction between a 
habit (an automatic process done many times) and a decision (a 
conscious action), Armour proposes that ―for a person who rejects the 
stereotype to avoid stereotype-congruent [behavior] responses to 
blacks (i.e, to avoid falling into a bad habit), she must intentionally 
inhibit the automatically activated stereotype and activate her newer 
personal belief structure.‖428 Since people may act on stereotypes 
automatically and without knowledge, they must actively monitor 
and inhibit the automatic stereotype and replace it with a personal 
egalitarian belief.
429
 ―[U]nless a low-prejudiced person consciously 
 
 425. Id. (citing Larry L. Jacoby et. al., Becoming Famous Overnight: Limits on the Ability 
to Avoid Unconscious Influences of the Past, 56 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 326 
(1989)).  
 426. Banaji & Greenwald, supra note 68, at 70. Some studies, however, imply that 
stereotypes are more difficult to suppress through controlled processes. In an experiment that 
required subjects to make a judgment of criminality using names that vary racially (black, 
white, Asian), researchers found race bias was difficult to remove even when subjects were 
alerted that racist individuals are more likely to identify black compared to white names. See 
Banaji & Dasgupta, supra note 133, at 162. Another study showed that participants ―explicitly 
instructed to avoid using race ironically performed worse (although not in a statistically 
significant way) than participants told nothing at all.‖ Kang, supra note 136, at 1529 (citing B. 
Keith Payne et al., Best Laid Plans: Effects of Goals on Accessibility Bias and Cognitive 
Control in Race-Based Misperceptions of Weapons, 38 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 384, 
390–91 (2002)). Researchers have also observed an effect called ―stereotype rebounding.‖ 
When people attempt to repress stereotypic thoughts, these thoughts may subsequently reappear 
with even greater insistence and be even more difficult to ignore. C. Neil Macrae et al., Out of 
Mind but Back in Sight: Stereotypes on the Rebound, 67 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 808 
(1994). 
 Thought suppression operates by searching for a distracter to replace the unwanted thought; 
however, when cognitive resources are limited, the ability to search for a distracter is precluded 
and the unwanted thought becomes hyperaccessible. Id. at 809 (citing Daniel M. Wegner & 
Ralph Erber, The Hyperaccessibility of Suppressed Thoughts, 63 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 903, 903–12 (1992)).  
 427. Armour, supra note 144, at 13. 
 428. Id. at 24. 
 429. Id. at 23–24. 
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monitors and inhibits the activation of a stereotype in the presence of 
a member (or symbolic equivalent) of a stereotyped group, she may 
unintentionally fall into the discrimination habit.‖430 Importing this 
model to the mediation context, mediators must break the habit of 
stereotype-consistent behavior by making conscious decisions to act 
in accordance with their non-discriminatory beliefs. 
We use mediation debriefings, case rounds, and journals to give 
students in the mediation clinic space within which to contemplate 
and comment on their reactions to situations in which prejudiced 
behavior and assumptions could, or did, surface. More importantly, 
students identify lessons they can take into future mediations. The 
practice of journaling, which is popular in law school clinics, is a 
learning device that would benefit veterans as well as new mediators. 
This type of written reflection could be adapted to court and 
community settings to encourage mediators to measure adherence to 
their own egalitarian goals throughout their mediations. Requiring 
mediators to articulate explicit plans for improvement challenges 
them to name their practice shortcomings and state personal 
performance goals and intentions. Administrators of mediation 
programs should embrace these activities by periodically bringing 
volunteers and staff together for candid conversations and 
brainstorming sessions on prejudice reduction strategies. Inexpensive 
―brown bag‖ lunch discussions on a regular basis would be a cost- 
and time-effective way to help mediators take basic steps toward bias 
reduction. 
Implicit social cognition research indicates that bias can be 
reduced through exposure to individuals who are not like us.
431
 This 
exposure can occur through interpersonal interaction and presentation 
of images. The ―Social Contact Hypothesis‖ postulates that 
stereotypes and prejudice can be reduced when people of different 
social categories have face-to-face interaction under certain 
conditions.
432
 A recent meta-analysis of studies found that intergroup 
contact correlates negatively with prejudice.
433
 Intergroup contact 
 
 430. Id. at 24. 
 431. Kang & Banaji, supra note 140, at 1101. 
 432. Id.  
 433. Id. at 1102–03. 
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may actually reduce levels of implicit bias.
434
 In one study, white 
subjects were asked to ―take the race IAT and report the number of 
their close out-group friends: African-Americans in one experiment 
and Latinos in another. . . . The researchers found negative 
correlations between the number of interracial friendships and level 
of implicit bias.‖435 Consistent with these findings, the C100 study 
referenced earlier revealed that ―the more prejudiced respondents 
tend to interact less frequently with Chinese and Asian 
Americans.‖436 
Along similar lines, implicit attitudes may be changed by 
exposure to positive images.
437
 In one study, subjects were shown 
photos of Martin Luther King Jr. and Denzel Washington as positive 
Black images.
438
 The group reduced implicit bias by more than half 
and the effect persisted for a full day.
439
 In the same manner, counter-
typical visualizations caused a decrease in implicit stereotypes in 
another experiment.
440
 In an experiment on explicit and implicit bias 
against women, direct educational instruction by counter-typical 
exemplars (female faculty) over one year had significant decreasing 
effects on IAT scores.
441
  
These research findings suggest that mediators may be able to 
reduce implicit bias through increased exposure to and encounters 
with positive examples of out-group members. Writing about racial 
 
 434. Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 969, 
981 (2006) (―A significant body of social science evidence supports the conclusion that the 
presence of population diversity in an environment tends to reduce the level of implicit bias.‖).  
 435. Kang & Banaji, supra note 140, at 1103 (citing Christopher L. Aberson et al., Implicit 
Bias and Contact: The Role of Interethnic Friendships, 144 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 335, 340, 343 
(2004)). 
 436. COMMITTEE OF 100 & HARRIS INTERACTIVE, supra note 262, at 68. 
 437. Nilanjana Dasgupta & Anthony G. Greenwald, On the Malleability of Automatic 
Attitudes: Combating Automatic Prejudice with Images of Admired and Disliked Individuals, 81 
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 800 (2001). 
 438. Id. at 802. 
 439. Id. at 807; see also Irene V. Blair et al., Imagining Stereotypes Away: The Moderation 
of Implicit Stereotypes Through Mental Imagery, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 828, 
837 (2001); Nilanjana Dasgupta & Shaki Asgari, Seeing Is Believing: Exposure to 
Counterstereotypic Women Leaders and Its Effect on the Malleability of Automatic Gender 
Stereotyping, 40 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 642 (2004). 
 440. Kang & Banaji, supra note 140, at 1107 (citing Blair et al., supra note 439, at 828–
29).  
 441. Id. (citing Dasgupta & Asgari, supra note 439, at 651).  
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issues in mediation, Howard Gadlin decries the lack of diversity in 
the dispute resolution field and urges greater racial and ethnic 
integration.
442
 Homogeneity among mediator ranks has spurred 
efforts to increase the numbers of minorities and expand practice 
opportunities for mediators of color.
443
 Employing counter-typical 
mediation trainers and teachers and enlarging mediator diversity 
would be rational moves toward implicit bias reduction. Because in-
group favoritism makes it hard to reduce prejudice, Carwina Weng 
notes that mere interaction with other groups is insufficient. Contact 
in a setting that promotes equality and openness is critical.
444
 She lists 
cooperation, constructive conflict resolution and internalized civic 
values as elements for building an egalitarian community in which 
non-discriminatory relationships are fostered.
445
 
A diversity training experiment supports Weng‘s suggestion that 
prejudice reduction is more successful when interaction is coupled 
with supporting knowledge and efforts. Researchers found that 
students enrolled in a prejudice and conflict seminar taught by an 
African American male professor were able to lower their bias by the 
end of the semester.
446
 Specific data indicated that an ―[i]ncreased 
awareness of discrimination against African Americans and motives 
to overcome prejudice in oneself‖ was more correlated with a 
reduction in explicit bias, while a ―positive evaluation of the 
professor and the prejudice and conflict seminar,‖ making friends 
with out-group members, and reporting feeling less threatened by 
out-group members, were more correlated with a reduction in implicit 
prejudice and stereotyping.
447
 A control group taught by an African 
American professor showed no reduction in prejudice and bias, 
leading to the conclusion that the presence of an African American 
 
 442. Howard Gadlin, Conflict Resolution, Cultural Differences, and the Culture of Racism, 
10 NEGOTIATION J. 33, 44 (1994). 
 443. Marvin E. Johnson & Homer C. La Rue, The Gated Community: Risk Aversion, Race, 
and the Lack of Diversity in Mediation in the Top Ranks, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Spring 2009, at 
17. 
 444. Carwina Weng, Individual and Intergroup Processes to Address Racial 
Discrimination in Lawyering Relationships, in CRITICAL RACE REALISM: INTERSECTIONS OF 
PSYCHOLOGY, RACE, AND LAW 64, 70 (Gregory S. Parks et al. eds., 2008). 
 445. Id. at 73. 
 446. Rudman et al., supra note 393, at 856. 
 447. Id. at 865 tbl.7. 
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figure in a prominent position alone had little to no effect on implicit 
or explicit bias.
448
  
3. Mindfulness Meditation  
A growing number of dispute resolution scholars tout the benefits 
of mindfulness meditation for practicing lawyers, particularly in 
negotiation.
449
 They contend that by adopting a non-judgmental 
perspective, mindfulness devotees ―respond more appropriately to 
situations—and the thoughts, feelings, and bodily sensations that the 
situations elicit in us—rather than reacting in habitual ways.‖450 
Enthusiasts contend that Buddhist principles underlying mindfulness 
meditation and specific practice techniques can bring clarity of 
purpose and enhanced attention,
451
 greater awareness and cognitive 
flexibility,
452
 and the ability to make better choices.
453
  
 
 448. Id.  
 449. Leonard L. Riskin, The Contemplative Lawyer: On the Potential Contributions of 
Mindfulness Meditation to Law Students, Lawyers, and their Clients, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 
1 (2002). Riskin claims that mindfulness practice could make lawyers and law students ―feel 
better and perform better at virtually any task‖ by reducing stress and improving the ability to 
concentrate. Id. at 46. He maintains that mindfulness meditation can help develop five 
emotional and social competencies of ―emotional intelligence‖: self-awareness, self-regulation, 
motivation, empathy, and social skills. Id. at 47 (citing DANIEL GOLEMAN, EMOTIONAL 
INTELLIGENCE: WHY IT CAN MATTER MORE THAN IQ (1995)); see also Darshan Brach, A Logic 
for the Magic of Mindful Negotiation, 24 NEGOTIATION J. 25 (2008); Clark Freshman et al., 
Adapting Meditation to Promote Negotiation Success: A Guide to Varieties and Scientific 
Support, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 67 (2002) [hereinafter Freshman et al., Adapting Mediation]; 
Clark Freshman, After Basic Mindfulness Meditation: External Mindfulness, Emotional 
Truthfulness, and Lie Detection in Dispute Resolution, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 511 [hereinafter 
Freshman, After Basic Mindfulness Mediation].  
 450. Riskin, supra note 449, at 29. 
 451. Brach, supra note 449, at 27–28. 
 452. Freshman et al., Adapting Mediation, supra note 449, at 74. Freshman et al. identify 
empirical support for professed benefits of mindfulness, citing psychological studies. Id. at 72–
77. Research ―neatly shows that both regular concentration and mindfulness meditation are 
associated with greater awareness.‖ Id. at 74. Importantly, awareness is essential to changing 
behavior. Id. at 74 (citing John D. Teasdale et al., Metacognitive Awareness and Prevention of 
Relapse in Depression: Empirical Evidence, 70 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 275 
(2002)). ―Social science research also suggests another promising object for mindful negotiators 
involves emotions.‖ Id. at 79. Freshman et al. observe that mindfulness of emotions can 
improve ―mood awareness,‖ allowing negotiators to understand what objects and thoughts 
induce positive mood and better negotiation results. Id. at 80. 
 453. Riskin, supra note 449, at 66. 
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Mindfulness meditation may help mediators attain greater bias 
reduction competency.
454
 If the ability to listen is the mediator‘s stock 
in trade and mindfulness helps lawyers surmount barriers to careful 
listening, mindful mediators would be free from ―distracting thoughts 
and emotions, ‗personal agendas,‘ and bias and prejudice based on 
the speaker‘s appearance, ethnicity, gender, speech or manner.‖455 
Mediators trained in mindfulness would be more conscious of bias 
and stereotypes seeping into their thoughts and judgments. With that 
heightened awareness, they could call upon improved concentration 
to make better choices in the way they conduct their mediations.
456
 
In summary, mediators have the ability to enhance internal 
neutrality by adopting explicit plans to reduce the application of 
stereotypes activated through encounters with parties and by 
replacing biased thoughts and reactions with non-prejudiced ones. 
Mediators must be aware of and acknowledge unconscious biases in 
order to garner the motivation to self-correct. A mediator‘s de-biasing 
action plan should include external and internal motivation to 
intervene with disputants in an egalitarian manner, attentiveness to 
prejudice-related discrepancies, and application of cognitive 
resources to reduce biased judgments and actions. By adopting 
individual ―implementation intention‖ goals and strategies, mediators 
can attenuate bias. To encourage and facilitate these efforts, 
mediation programs should incorporate bias-reduction teaching 
techniques, make bias and prejudice reduction a robust part of the 
curriculum, and develop protocols that stress self-awareness, self-
monitoring, and self-correction. Practices that sharpen a mediator‘s 
awareness, listening skills, and concentration (such as mindfulness 
meditation) may help mediators attain freedom from bias and 
prejudice. 
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CONCLUSION  
Extensive research and analysis related to mediator behavior, the 
dynamics of the mediation process, and the science of implicit social 
cognition reveal a huge gap between the vision of mediator neutrality 
and the realities of biased mediator thoughts and actions. Well-
meaning mediators who espouse egalitarian views need more than a 
―wish and a prayer‖ to actualize non-biased feelings, behaviors, and 
judgments. When confronted with scientific findings and empirical 
evidence, mediation professionals must concede that the requirements 
for eliminating racial, gender, and other types of bias in mediation 
have not been met. 
I present the small claims mediation scenario as an example of a 
situation in which no one refers to race but ―race [is] speaking sotto 
voce.‖457 These types of cases are can be instructive because they 
―reveal how profoundly issues of difference have permeated the 
unconscious as well as the consciousness of people in our society.‖458 
Reflecting on such a case, Gadlin muses, ―At times I feel so 
conscious of the way my response to peoples‘ stories and 
interventions in their conflicts is infiltrated by my own 
racial/ethnic/gender identity.‖459 Mediation practice would be 
substantially improved if all mediators attained an equally critical 
self-consciousness.
460
 
My goal in writing this Article is to challenge mediation teachers, 
trainers, and practitioners to admit to impartiality shortcomings and 
undertake concrete measures to alter the way we think and act. 
Defining what it means to be racially unbiased also presents 
difficulties. Many people think that being unbiased means they do not 
―see‖ race, gender, or ethnicity. People claim to be ―color-blind,‖ 
viewing this as the achievement of a non-prejudiced state of mind. 
―According to the most straightforward account, to be racially 
unbiased would require one to accord race no more significance than, 
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say, eye or hair color, and to act as though one does not notice 
race.‖461 But  
social practices and legal rules permit, indeed encourage, some 
species of race consciousness that virtually no one views as 
morally objectionable. Identifying racial bias, then, must entail 
deciding that some forms of race consciousness are more, or 
less, morally objectionable than others, a determination with 
respect to which reasonable minds may differ.
462
  
Race has been such a pervasive and salient feature in our history 
and current society that everyone is subject to race consciousness.
463
 
The pervasiveness of implicit bias opens a new route to discussions 
of bias prevention and mitigation. The existence of unconscious bias 
does not necessarily mean that people with egalitarian beliefs are 
racists or liars.
464
 Having discriminatory thoughts does not mean a 
low-prejudiced person endorses the belief; rather, it is an indication 
of the vigor of well-learned cultural stereotypes.
465
  
Along the same lines, the operation of stereotypes need not be 
illustrative of a person‘s ―moral failure.‖ Gary Blasi points out that 
moralizing strategies are ineffective in combating stereotypes and 
prejudice.
466
 He contends that ―the science [of implicit social 
cognition] demonstrates in many ways that there is unlikely to be 
such a thing as a nonracialized setting in the United States, if we 
include the various ways in which race operates indirectly.‖467 He 
urges legal scholars and advocates to become knowledgeable about 
research on cognitive science and social psychology so they may 
overcome their own biases.
468
 I call on mediators to do the same, lest 
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we be well-meaning but ineffective actors in the struggle to eliminate 
bias in mediation.  
In a study of interracial tension, Patricia Devine and Kristin 
Vasquez considered the problem that the good intentions of low-
prejudiced people  
are useful only if they are accurately interpreted by the target 
of those intentions. Intentions cannot be seen and must be 
inferred from behavior. This could be a problem if, for 
example, minority group members rely on the types of 
nonverbal behaviors that do not distinguish between anxiety 
and hostility.
469
  
The authors note the potential for miscommunication that could 
escalate rather than alleviate tension.
470
 They suggest that ―the single 
most important problem facing us over time is that we are afraid to 
communicate.‖471 They provoke with questions: 
What if we gave up the pretense that we ‗should know what to 
do‘? What if we admitted ignorance when it exists and 
confessed our desire to learn and understand? . . . But this 
approach may be a better starting point for alleviating tension 
than trying to fake it through the interaction and worrying the 
whole time about what we‘re doing wrong.472  
The veneer of neutrality is stripped away by research findings that 
show convincingly that mediators fall far short of the ethical duty to 
treat parties impartially and without bias. Under current conditions, 
we are failing to meet our articulated goals and the expectations of 
the parties. Surely, it is naïve to think we can completely eliminate 
bias in mediation. It is equally certain that nondiscrimination in 
mediation is attainable only with more deliberate, informed, and self-
conscious practices by mediators.  
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